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PROLOGUE

A

n independent judiciary is an essential prerequisite for a democratic State governed by
the rule of law. Several international instruments, as well as the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court, recognize the independence of the judiciary from other branches
of government. Judicial review of the constitutionality and legality of the acts of government,
which is arguably the judiciary’s most significant role in a democratic system, is only possible in
a context of judicial independence. Therefore, judicial independence is an essential principle for
ensuring the respect of human rights.
However, the studies executed and experience acquired by DPLF show that in Latin America, respect for judicial independence is deficient and that, as a result, the judiciaries in the
region remain weak. Although threats to judicial independence may come from various sectors
of society, interference in the work of the judiciary is largely caused by other political powers.
Such interference can be seen clearly in the appointment of ‘friends’ or ‘trusted’ individuals to
the highest courts of a country.
This has serious implications, especially in democracies where institutions are still fragile
and institutional leaders play a fundamental role. Not only do they direct the course of institutions, but they also act as role models. When their leaders are competent professionals of
high moral standing, institutions can make important progress in strengthening the rule of
law. Otherwise, influence-peddling and corruption erode democratic institutions and become
entrenched. Sadly, this is largely the case in many Latin American countries.
As a result of attempts to control the high courts of justice through politically motivated
appointments –instead of nominating candidates based on their merit- the members of the
highest courts in the region are not necessarily the most qualified professionals, but rather individuals having a personal or ideological affiliation with the political power in office. At the very
least, this gives the impression that such judicial officials lack independence. In practice, it also
prevents the effective separation of powers: due to political influence, the judiciary fails to fulfill
its democratic role as a check on the other powers of government, hindering the operation of
the rule of law.
Besides when influence is purely political, for instance when a powerful sector of the economy has strong links with the corridors of power, it appears that judicial decisions that affect
economic interests are controlled by those powers regardless of the public interest.
Not only is the functioning of a country’s highest courts of justice impacted by shortcomings in the system for the selection of their members, the lower court are affected as well. Due to
the influence exerted by the highest courts over lower judges in decisions concerning appointments, promotions and disciplinary matters, controlling the justices of the highest courts of a
country guarantees the power to influence the entire judiciary.
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This highlights the fundamental need to improve the systems for the selection and appointment of the highest court justices. Improvements made in the selection process will not solve all
the problems affecting the judiciary, but having individuals of greater integrity and ability will
allow us to begin to address other concerns.
The main problems identified by DPLF1 are:
1.

Lack of an independent and autonomous body responsible for the selection procedure;

2.

Lack of a clear and previously established selection procedure explaining how candidates should be assessed;

3.

Lack of objective criteria for the assessment of candidates; and

4.

Lack of transparency of the selection procedure and lack of meaningful civil society
engagement in general.

DPLF has developed Guidelines for a transparent and merit-based system for the appoint
ment of Supreme Court justices, as an input to improve selection procedures. These guidelines
are based on international standards, and capture international best practices. The guidelines
include suggestions concerning selection procedures and the required qualifications for justices.
With regard to the selection procedure, DPLF considers that:
■■

The entities responsible for shortlisting the candidates must be autonomous;

■■

The desired profile of justices should be clearly and previously established;

■■

■■

■■
■■

■■
1

The requirements and abilities of candidates should be established and published in
advance of competitions, and the assessment criteria should be explicitly stated;
The selection procedure, as well as the responsibilities of all actors engaged in such
procedure, should be clearly established;
The transparency and publicity of all stages of this procedure should be ensured;
The entities responsible for shortlisting the candidates should be able to receive chal
lenges from different sectors of society against the candidates and to investigate such
challenges; and
Public hearings must be held to assess the candidates’ qualifications.

See: Due Process of Law Foundation (DPLF), Estado de Derecho e independencia judicial en Centroaméri
ca, report presented before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, October 2012, available at
www.dplf.org.
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To ensure that only the most suitable candidates are selected, DPLF believes that the re
quired qualifications should include:
■■

Independence and impartiality (both objective and subjective);

■■

Reputable conduct and a spotless personal and professional record of integrity;

■■

Extraordinary knowledge of the law;

■■

Good oral and written communication skills and analytical competency;

■■

Well-developed creative intelligence;

■■

Ability to find solutions to the problems presented to them;

■■

Capacity to seek and build consensus;

■■

Ability to take into account other people’s views;

■■

Commitment to the judiciary as a public institution;

■■

■■
■■

Demonstrated commitment to the protection of human rights, democratic values
and transparency;
Ability to understand the social and legal consequences of judicial decisions; and
Ability to strike a sound balance between a high level of productivity, the quality of
judicial decisions and a careful consideration of cases.

DPLF has found that comparative experiences regarding the selection of high-level justices
can provide valuable insight. However, it is important to emphasize that suggesting new models
or copying those of other countries will not suffice. On the contrary: we should bear in mind
that each country’s reality is different, and that local experts will be best placed to establish
which elements would be useful in their country.
As many countries have dealt with the problems associated with the appointment of high
court justices, a range of models are now available. Although some have achieved better results
than others, we feel that important lessons can be drawn from the most salient experiences,
including unsuccessful cases. Understanding why some practices have worked and others have
failed is an important step. Learning about these experiences can help national experts develop
suitable mechanisms for the context of their respective countries.
For this reason, DPLF considers that a comparative study of judicial appointment practices
is an important contribution to this discussion. The reputable law firm Kirkland & Ellis LLP
has generously agreed to conduct this study pro-bono. A highly motivated team of attorneys,
led by Tefft Smith, and consisting of Michael Fragoso, Christopher Jackson, Christa Laser, and
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Gregory Wannier from that law firm, performed a comparative analysis of the procedures for
the appointment of high court justices in the United States, both at the federal and state levels.
These practices were also examined in other European and Asian countries to provide a fuller
picture of the selection of justices internationally.
DPLF believes that this study is a valuable contribution to ideas and debates in Latin America regarding judicial selection, and would like to thank Kirkland & Ellis LLP for their dedication
in conducting this research and for their crucial support in making this publication possible.

Katya Salazar
Executive Director
Due Process of Law Foundation (DPLF)

Mirte Postema
Senior Program Officer
Judicial Independence Program
Due Process of Law Foundation (DPLF)
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Introduction

T

his paper has been prepared by Kirkland & Ellis LLP for the Due Process of Law Foundation (“DPLF”), an organization dedicated to promoting and strengthening the rule
of law and the respect for human rights in the Americas. The goal is to provide further
stimulus to the enhancement of due process and the rule of law in Latin America by encouraging the transparent, merit-based selection and appointment of competent, independent, and
impartial judges. An independent and impartial judiciary is an essential precondition to the
effective operation of the rule of law, with due process for all. This, in turn, is vital for the existence of democratic societies.
There is general recognition that the protection of human rights and the promotion of economic development are best achieved under a political system governed by the rule of law. The
critical importance of the rule of law is underscored by the recently initiated and comprehensive
World Justice Project (“WJP”), financed by the Bill Gates Foundation and others. The Project
was premised on the principle that “[e]stablishing the rule of law is fundamental to achieving
communities of opportunity and equity—communities that offer sustainable economic development, accountable government, and respect for fundamental rights.”2

The overall success of a nation -- both politically and economically -- is enhanced by the
perception of its general populace that the decisions of the country’s judicial system are based
on the rule of law, instead of on political influence or economic corruption. The World Economic Forum issues an annual Global Competitiveness Report (“GCR”) that analyzes various
countries’ legal systems on a variety of factors that highlight the importance of the rule of law
for the functioning of democratic societies, with due process for all. 3
The GCR report focuses on a country’s “institutional environment.” That is largely “determined by the legal and administrative framework within which individuals, firms and governments interact[.]” Key factors for an institutional environment are “judicial independence . . .
from influences of members of government, citizens or firms;” legal protection of intellectual
and other property rights; the level of corruption in judicial and governmental decisionmaking;
the “efficiency” of the legal system in allowing challenges to governmental action and regulation
and in resolving private disputes; and the “transparency” of governmental decision-making.4
Both the World Justice Project and the GCR have analyzed how effective the rule of law is in
Latin America. They report that the general perception is that, in many Latin American countries, the judiciary is neither politically independent nor impartial. There is a belief that much
of the Latin American judiciary is subject to executive governmental and economic corruption.
As the WJP observed, “Latin America presents a picture of sharp contrasts. In spite of recent
2

3

4

Mark David Agrast et al., The World Justice Project Rule of Law Index 2012-2013 1 (2013), http://
worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/WJP_Index_Report_2012.pdf (hereinafter “WJP 2013”).
World Economic Forum, The Global Competitiveness Report 2011-2012 4 (Klaus Schwab ed., 2011),
available at http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GCR_Report_2011-12.pdf (hereinafter “GCR”).
Id. at 395, 390-409.
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movements towards openness and political freedoms that have positioned many countries at
the forefront of protecting basic rights and civil liberties, the region’s public institutions remain
fragile. Corruption and a lack of government accountability are still prevalent[.]”5
Likewise, the GCR states that first among “the persistent challenges” that face Latin American countries is “weak” legal and other institutions. Indeed, on the critical issue of judicial
independence, out of 142 nations rated, Venezuela ranked dead last, Paraguay was 138th, Nicaragua 136th, Panama 133rd, Ecuador 130th, Argentina 124th, Peru 119th, Guatemala 117th,
El Salvador 106th, Bolivia 100th, Mexico 89th, Colombia 81st, Honduras 77th, and Brazil 71st.
Only Costa Rica (38th) and Chile (24th) had above-average ratings.6
As emphasized in the World Justice Project, an essential element for assuring that judges
are impervious to efforts at political and economic corruption (and that their rulings are based
on the law and facts) is to assure that the judicial selection process produces a competent, independent, and impartial judiciary, committed to due process for all. Indeed, one of “the four
universal principles” for the proper functioning of the rule of law is that “[j]ustice is delivered by
competent, ethical, and independent representatives and neutrals who are of sufficient number,
have adequate resources, and reflect the makeup of the communities they serve.”7
“Independence” means freedom from political influence or economic corruption. “Competence” is defined not only by knowledge of the law but by life and legal experience, and by a “judicial temperament.” “Impartiality” is the core qualification that has been consistently identified
as being the type of judicial temperament desired for an independent judiciary.
The need for a competent and independent judiciary is universally recognized as essential
to individual rights and due process of law. As Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights notes, “All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals [and] everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial
tribunal established by law.”8 Likewise, Article 8 of the Inter-American Convention on Human
Rights provides: “Every person has the right to a hearing, with due guarantees and within a
reasonable time, by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal, previously established
by law[.]”9
Many differing methods have been tried (with varying degrees of success) to promote the
existence of a competent, independent and impartial judiciary. Selection processes range from
executive appointment (sometimes with legislative approval), to popular elections, to selection
by “senior” judges, or groups of legal professionals. Differing terms of service exist, varying
from lifetime appointments, to specific numbers of years, to life tenure with various mandatory
retirement ages and/or unless removed by popular vote, executive or legislative action.
5
6
7
8

9

WJP 2013, supra note 2, at 44.
GCR, supra note 3, at 31, 395.
WJP 2013, supra note 2, at 9.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966 available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/
ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CCPR.aspx.
Organization of American States, Inter-American Convention on Human Rights Article 8, section 1 (Nov.
22, 1969) available at http://www.cidh.org/Basicos/English/Basic3.American%20Convention.htm.
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Each of these approaches has its pros and cons. The following is a review of how judges
are selected in the United States and in a cross-section of European and Asian countries. The
focus is upon the process for selecting the judges for the “Supreme” or highest court in each
jurisdiction. Typically, a nation’s Supreme Court sets the tone for the rest of the judicial system.
The Supreme Court is often not only the final authority on the interpretation of a nation’s laws,
but is also responsible for the internal administration of the country’s judicial system. Further, a
nation’s Supreme Court often also has disciplinary (as well as appellate review) powers over the
nation’s lower-court judges.
In sum, there is no “perfect” model for selecting judges for the highest courts of a country.
The results that will be obtained by any particular model are highly dependent on the political
and social context of a country—or state. A method that works well in a particular country
might not produce desirable results elsewhere, which is why an analysis of the local context is
always an essential starting point. That said, the analyses of the strengths and weaknesses of the
selection methods adopted in the United States and in various European and Asian countries
may be instructive in assessing what might work for any country considering efforts to enhance
the effectiveness of the operation of the rule of law in that country.
It is important to note, however, that the process for the appointment of a nation’s Supreme
Court justices is but one factor in enhancing the effectiveness of the rule of law in that country.
The importance of whom is to become a Supreme Court justice means that better candidates
emerge and the process of selection becomes of greater public interest, promoting the transparency that is essential to the best outcomes for the public at large. The size of the Supreme Court
matters as well; it should be a reasonable, uneven number. Too many justices make deliberations
and decision making inefficient.
Questions have been raised about the wisdom of life tenure (as is still granted to U.S. Supreme Court Justices) in an age of extended longevity. Mandatory retirement ages have been
adopted in many jurisdictions, with no seemingly detrimental effects on the ability to attract
competent persons to serve on a nation’s highest court. A mandatory retirement age—of not less
than 70 nor more than 80 years of age—seems sensible to this day and age.
Experience also suggests that the best outcomes are achieved where judicial pay and pensions are guaranteed.
To minimize existing governmental control over the judiciary, it has been shown that the
right to remove a Supreme Court justice should be carefully circumscribed to conduct detrimental to the independence and integrity of the Supreme Court itself, e.g., evidence of corruption, mental incapacity, criminal misconduct, etc. The process for removal should mirror the
method for approving a justice. No justice should be removed without having the due process
of open hearings on the grounds for removal. Impeachment should, for example, require a twothirds majority vote to deter ready resort to the removal process for political dissatisfaction.
At the end of this paper, we will elaborate on these points and make more detailed suggestions on the qualifications that are desirable for the justices of a nation’s Supreme Court. Ultimately, it is the quality of the justices that will best assure their independence, impartiality and
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effectiveness in enforcing the rule of law. Consideration should be given to promoting diversity
on the Supreme Court, with a fair representation of women and differing ethnicities residing in
the nation involved.
Lastly, and most importantly, it is essential for the effective operation of the rule of law that
there be a societal as well as a governmental commitment to equal justice for all. That is best
achieved by active attention to and coverage by the press and other media of what then becomes
a transparent, public process for the appointment and selection of the nation’s Supreme Court
justices. The societal commitment is further fostered by educating the nation’s citizenry—from
an early age—on the values of free speech and freedom of the press and the benefits of a competent and independent judiciary, with Supreme Court justices who can and will enforce the rule
of law, with due process for all. Therefore, a courageous press and committed educators at all
levels are need if there is to develop the type of societal demand for the rule of law and respect
for human rights that will be honored by the nation’s governmental officials.

/1

I. The Appointment Process for Justices
of the U.S. Supreme Court
A. The Evolution of the Supremacy of the U.S. Supreme Court
The respected standing of the United States Supreme Court, as the accepted ultimate arbiter
of all important legal issues facing American society, is the product of a long (albeit early on
contentious) evolution. Indeed, the American Revolution of 1776 was in large part prompted by
complaints of American colonists about the arbitrary and extraordinary power of the “judges”
appointed by the designees of the English King.10 “Judges” were appointed not so much for their
legal acumen as their social and political connections. Being a judge was simply one among
many political and administrative powers.11
Accordingly, immediately after the American Revolution there were efforts in many of the
former English colonies to reduce the influence of the judiciary. The resulting chaos yielded the
U.S. Constitution, with its “checks and balances,” and tripartite “separation of [Executive, Legislative and Judicial] powers.” The Judiciary was given an equal place within the governmental
structure alongside the Executive and the Legislative branches.12 Article III of the Constitution
provided for U.S. Supreme Court Justices to be appointed by the President, with the advice and
consent of the Senate, to hold office “during good Behavior,” effectively life tenure.
A lifetime appointment (subject only to Legislative impeachment for gross malfeasance)
was viewed as necessary to protect the impartiality of judicial decisionmakers from fear of retribution by public and private actors.13 The drafters of the Constitution believed that life tenure would ensure an “independent spirit in the judges” that would permit them to protect the
Constitution from “encroachment” of the more political branches of government. The drafters
explained that “nothing can contribute so much to [the federal judiciary’s] firmness and independence as permanency in office.”14 The belief was that, if a judge could be removed for a politically unpopular decision, the judge would be much more likely to render politically popular
decisions so that his or her future career would be better protected after leaving office. As one
scholar has observed, “Regardless of whether a judge is elected by the public or appointed by
public officials, if the judge has life tenure, it is thought that the judge will feel free to enforce

10

11

12
13

14

“Indeed, one of the major complaints of the American colonists against royal authority in the eighteenth
century was the extraordinary degree of discretion exercised by royal judges.” Gordon S. Wood, Comment,
in Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation 49, 50 (1997).
Id. at 53. Professor Wood tells of one “Thomas Hutchinson of Massachusetts,” who, in the 1760s, was “chief
justice of the superior court, lieutenant governor, member of the [legislative] council, and judge of probate
of Suffolk County all at the same time.”
Id. at 52.
Judith Resnik, Judicial Selection and Democratic Theory: Demand, Supply, and Life Tenure, 26 Cardozo L.
Rev. 579, 584, 591 (2005).
Denis Steven Rutkus, Congressional Research Service, Supreme Court Appointment Process: Roles of the
President, Judiciary Committee, and Senate 1 (2010) (quoting Alexander Hamilton, Federalist Paper 78).
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constitutional restrictions on public preferences. By contrast, if the judge has to come before the
public or even elected officials periodically, it is thought that the judge may not feel so free.”15
Independence was further protected by the Constitution’s guarantee of the judiciary’s pay,
so that the Legislature cannot use compensation as a tool of control. The reasoning was that, if
a judge could keep the job but face a pay cut for rendering politically unpopular decisions, the
judge would again be leery of making those decisions.16
Notwithstanding the intent of the Constitution’s authors, initially there were questions
about the political independence and impartiality of the first appointees to the Supreme Court.
Justices John Jay and Oliver Ellsworth notably operated as diplomats while on the first Supreme
Court. Jay even served simultaneously as Secretary of State and the Court’s Chief Justice.17
Shortly before John Adams’s defeat by Thomas Jefferson in the Presidential election of 1800,
Adams appointed one of his “Federalist” friends, Samuel Chase, as a Supreme Court Justice,
with the consent of the then-Federalist-controlled Senate. The “Democrats” (or “Jeffersonians”)
who won both houses of Congress as well as the Presidency, promptly attempted to impeach
Justice Chase based on his alleged Federalist partiality. That effort failed, thereby setting an important and now respected precedent in the United States that the Legislature should exercise
caution in attempting to influence the Supreme Court with even the threat of impeachment
proceedings. No U.S. Supreme Court Justice has ever been impeached.18
Fortuitously, the United States was blessed with the early emergence (and long tenure, from
1801 to 1835) of John Marshall as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Chief Justice Marshall
“retreated from . . . advanced and exposed political positions” and forcefully fostered the preeminence of the impartial rule of law.19 This was most dramatically demonstrated in the most
famous of all Supreme Court decisions, Marbury v. Madison. There, in 1803, the Court declared
in an opinion by Chief Justice Marshall, that it had the right to invalidate Congressional legislation as inconsistent with the rules of law established by the Constitution.20

15

16

17
18

19
20

Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The Constitutionality of Federal Jurisdiction-Stripping Legislation and the History of
State Judicial Selection and Tenure, 98 Va. L. Rev. 839, 852-53 (2012).
See U.S. Const. art. III, § 1 (“The judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their offices
during good behaviour, and shall, at stated times, receive for their services, a compensation, which shall not
be diminished during their continuance in office.”).
Wood, supra note 10, at 55.
See William H. Rehnquist, Grand Inquests 114 (1992) (“The acquittal of Samuel Chase by the Senate
had a profound impact on the American judiciary. First, it assured the independence of federal judges from
congressional oversight of the decisions they made in the cases that came before them. Second, by assuring
that impeachment would not be used in the future as a method to remove members of the Supreme Court
for their judicial opinions, it helped to safeguard the independence of that body.”). While impeachment and
conviction is possible, no justice has ever been removed from office involuntarily, though one, Samuel Chase,
was impeached but acquitted, some were investigated but not impeached, and another resigned prior to an
investigation. Rutkus, supra note 19, at 2 n. 6.
Id. at 56.
5 U.S. 137 (1803).
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That was the start of a process that has resulted in American “[j]udges ha[ving] acquired an
independent standing in American culture,” which enabled them to effectively curb abuses of
executive and legislative power.21

B. The Transparent Selection Process for U.S. Supreme Court
Justices
1. The Formal Process
The “Appointments Clause” of the Constitution states that the President “shall nominate, and by
and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint . . . Judges of the Supreme Court.”22
The Senate has developed detailed procedures to evaluate a candidate once nominated by the
President. The Senate proceedings have become very public, with live televised hearings at all
levels and intense media coverage.
Since the mid-1800s, the judicial nominees selected by the President have been reviewed
first by the Senate’s Judiciary Committee.23 The Committee issues each nominee an extensive
personal data questionnaire seeking information on the nominee’s past legal experience, financial holdings, and writings. Most of the answers are made part of the public record for media
and other commentary, with the exception of certain financial information and information
from the FBI’s investigation of the candidate. The Committee also asks follow-up questions
of the nominee (often based on suggestions from the press and interested citizens who have
reviewed the publicly released materials). There are also requests for information issued to organizations for which the nominee worked.24
By tradition, the chair of the Judiciary Committee invites the American Bar Association
to make an evaluation of the professional qualifications of the nominee. The ABA’s assessment
focuses on the issues of “integrity, professional competence and judicial temperament.” Specifically, when considering “integrity,” the ABA looks to the opinions of the legal community on
the nominee’s character and reputation. The ABA’s evaluation of “professional competence”
embodies qualities including knowledge, writing skill, and legal experience. When evaluating
“judicial temperament,” the ABA considers traits including the nominee’s patience, decisiveness, and commitment to equality under the law.25
Customarily, the ABA is the first witness at the public hearings that the Committee holds
to assess the qualifications of the nominee.26 In making its recommendation, the ABA reviews
the nominee’s personal history and any published judicial opinions, written statements and other
writings. The ABA utilizes groups of law professors and others who specialize in the Supreme
21
22
23
24
25

26

Wood, supra note 10, at 49, 58.
U.S. Const., art II, § 2, cl. 2.
Rutkus, supra note 14, at 2.
Id. at 22.
American Bar Association, ABA Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary: What It Is and
How it Works 3 (2009), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/
federal_judiciary/federal_judiciary09.authcheckdam.pdf.
Rutkus, supra note 14, at 24-26.
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ABA’s Considerations:
• Integrity: “the prospective nominee’s
character and general reputation in
the legal community, as well as the
prospective nominee’s industry and
diligence”
• Professional Competence: “intellectual
capacity, judgment, writing and analytical
abilities, knowledge of the law, and
breadth of professional experience”
• Judicial Temperament: “compassion,
decisiveness, open-mindedness,
courtesy, patience, freedom from bias,
and commitment to equal justice under
the law”

Court to review the materials. It conducts extensive confidential interviews with judges,
lawyers and others who are familiar with the
nominee’s experience and character. The ABA
then interviews the nominee, providing him
or her with an opportunity to rebut any unfavorable information. Finally, the ABA prepares a written report on the nominee, which
is sent to the President and to the Judiciary
Committee. The ABA rates the nominee as
“not qualified,” “qualified,” or “well-qualified.”
The ABA has, with few exceptions, found
Supreme Court nominees to be “well-qualified.”27

The nominee will then testify before,
and be questioned by, the Judiciary Committee. Interested organization representatives
and citizens can ask to appear to make statements and be questioned about their support for (or
opposition to) the candidate. Following the hearing, the Judiciary Committee will recommend
(or not recommend) the candidate for confirmation. The Senate typically accepts the Committee’s recommendation, with the most recent exception being the confirmation of now-Justice
Clarence Thomas, nominated by President George H.W. Bush in 1991. Justice Thomas was confirmed by a 52-48 vote in the full Senate, overriding a close Judiciary Committee vote recommending against his nomination.28
The full Senate vote follows a floor debate amongst the Senators. Both the Judiciary Committee’s hearings leading up to its recommendation and the floor debate are televised, live. As
noted, this has resulted in intense media and public scrutiny of the process and the qualifications and character of the nominees.29
Almost all of the materials that the Judiciary Committee and the full Senate consider are
27

28
29

American Bar Association, ABA Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary: What It Is
and How it Works 9 (2009), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_
build/federal_judiciary/federal_judiciary09.authcheckdam.pdf; see also American Bar Association,
Evaluations of Supreme Court Nominations, available at http://www.americanbar.org/groups/
committees/federal_judiciary/resources/supreme_court_nominations.html (providing a rating and written
report on nominees); Statement of Kim J Askew Concerning the Nomination of The Honorable Elena
Kagan before the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States (July 1, 2010), at 5, 10 available at http://
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/scfedjud/SCpage/kaganstatement.authcheckdam.pdf);
Rutkus, supra note 14, at 24-26, 35 n. 133.
Rutkus, supra note 14, at 2 29-35.
Id. at 35-38. For example, public broadcast television typically shows the entirety of the hearings, while
private news organizations will highlight and comment on important clips. Additionally, the nominee’s
answers at the hearings are subject to commentary in newspapers and editorials. See, e.g., Charlie Savage &
Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Kagan Follows Precedent by Offering Few Opinions, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2010, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/30/us/30kagan.html.
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made a part of the public record. For example, the voluminous materials for the recent hearings
concerning President Obama’s nominations of Elena Kagan and Sonia Sotomayor were available by retrievable internet links on the Judiciary Committee’s website. The links included the
answers to the Committee’s questionnaire, responses of all parties to other information requests,
and letters received favoring (or opposing) the respective nominations.30 As a consequence of all
of this scrutiny, the appointment process for U.S. Supreme Court Justices has become an intense
and lengthy, multi-month exercise.
For example, Elena Kagan was nominated in May 2010 and confirmed in August 2010.
Sonia Sotomayor was nominated in May 2009 and confirmed in August 2009. Samuel Alito was
nominated in November 2005 and confirmed in January 2006. Each was the subject of intense
press, internet and other media and public scrutiny.

2. Informal Processes
Presidents recognize that the choice of a Supreme Court Justice, with life tenure, can have an
impact lasting long beyond the term of their Presidency.31 Given the importance of the selection
of a Justice, Presidents carefully consider whom to nominate.
The President solicits recommendations from high-level advisors within the Cabinet, as
well as from private lawyers and other sources. The Office of the Counsel to the President exhaustively vets potential candidates. A nominee’s financial records are examined by the Federal
Bureau of Investigations. Presidents typically conduct in-person interviews of prospective nominees to make sure that they are comfortable with making a choice which has proven to be one
of the most important Presidential acts.32
To maximize the likelihood of a successful appointment (and to minimize the delay and
disruption of divisive confirmation battles), Presidents typically consult with Senators in advance, seeking bi-partisan support, before they formally nominate a candidate. Presidents (directly or through Executive Office advisors) discuss potential candidates with Congressional
leaders for both parties, the members of the Judiciary Committee and Senators from the home
state of the potential nominee.33
Given the recognized importance and public interest in who will become a Supreme Court
Justice, Presidents also float the names of potential candidates to the press to gauge the media’s
reactions, before formally nominating anyone. This is a more recent phenomenon given the
30

31

32
33

United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, The Supreme Court of The United States, http://www.
judiciary.senate.gov/nominations/SupremeCourt/SupremeCourt.cfm; United States Senate Committee
on the Judiciary, Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court - Elena Kagan, http://www.judiciary.senate.
gov/nominations/SupremeCourt/KaganIndex.cfm; see also, e.g., U.S. Government Printing Office, Senate
Hearing 111-1044: The Nomination of Elena Kagan to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111shrg67622/html/CHRG-111shrg67622.htm.
Rutkus, supra note 14, at 3 n. 9 (“Looking back on his appointment a quarter century before, [President]
Adams in 1826 was quoted as saying, ‘My gift of John Marshall to the people of the United States was the
proudest act of my life.’”).
Id. at 7, 11-14; 12 n. 46.
Id. at 7.
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emergence of an increasingly partisan and aggressive 24/7 internet and cable television media.34
The media itself engages in ongoing speculation as to who are the likely candidates for the next
Supreme Court vacancy.35
Given the intensity, importance and public focus on the Senate hearings, the Office of the
Counsel to the President spends considerable time and effort to help the nominee prepare for
the Judiciary Committee hearing, and the many interviews requested by individual Senators
before the final confirmation vote.36

C. Criteria for Selection
1. Formal Criteria
Other than the requirement for “good Behavior,” there are no formal rules as to who can be a
Supreme Court Justice.

2. Informal Criteria
There are, however, many informal considerations. At a minimum, the President wants to
demonstrate that his Office has made a careful choice of someone with high professional qualifications, an impeccable character, legal experience and a judicial temperament.37
These are the factors that are considered to be “givens” for a Supreme Court nominee. They
are the criteria expressly evaluated by the American Bar Association in making its standard
report to the Senate Judiciary Committee.38 They are also the criteria stated to be the primary
considerations by the President and all Senators involved.39
a) Judicial Temperament: Integrity, Impartiality and Competence
The most often-cited professional qualification of a Supreme Court nominee is “judicial temperament.” A 1996 report by the Commission on Judicial Selection declared “judicial temperament” to be the “most important” of all qualifications.40 As one of the Founding Fathers of the
Constitution observed: “[T]here can be but few men in the society who will have sufficient skill
in the laws to qualify them for the status as judges. And making the proper deductions for the
ordinary depravity of human nature, the number must be still smaller of those who unite the
requisite integrity with the requisite knowledge.”41
34
35

36
37
38
39
40

41

Id. at 26-27.
See, e.g., Bill Mears, Supreme Court Possibilities if Obama is Reelected, CNN, Oct. 1, 2012, available at http://
www.cnn.com/2012/09/30/politics/court-obama-list.
Rutkus, supra note 14, at 28.
Rutkus, supra note 14. at 8.
American Bar Association, supra note 27 at 9-10.
Rutkus, supra note 14, at 10-11, 38.
Miller Center of Public Affairs, Improving the Process of Appointing Federal Judges: A Report of the Miller
Center Commission on the Selection of Federal Judges 10 (1996).
Rutkus, supra note 14 at 10 (citing Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 78 (1788), in The Federalist by
Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay 496 (Benjamin Fletcher, ed.1966)).
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Presidents have consistently declared that a judicial temperament is the key qualification.42
Senators who argue against a nominee typically assert that the candidate will advocate from the
bench for some specific group of people or cause (e.g. pro- or anti-abortion), claiming that such
a person lacks the requisite judicial temperament and would “abandon impartiality and instead
engage in results-oriented judging.”43
As for the other qualifications, “integrity” encompasses such traits as character, reputation in the legal community, industry, and diligence. “Professional competence” is measured by
“qualities of intellectual capacity, judgment, writing and analytical abilities, knowledge of the
law, and breadth of professional and judicial experience.”44
Recent empirical research demonstrates that, while Senators are likely to support a politically similar candidate with imperfect qualifications, they are also likely to support a politically
distinct candidate who has the traditional qualifications of established legal competency, a judicial temperament and a track record of independence and impartiality.45
b) Political Considerationsa
Many believe that integrity, competence and impartiality should be the only criteria for a U.S.
Supreme Court Justice. As a prominent, long-serving member of the Senate Judiciary Committee stated, “[T]he Senate’s responsibility to provide advice and consent does not include an
ideological litmus test because a nominee’s personal opinions are largely irrelevant so long as
the nominee can set those opinions aside and follow the law fairly and impartially as a judge.”46
That was not the case in the unsuccessful 1987 nomination by President Ronald Reagan of
then-D.C. Circuit judge Robert Bork. Judge Bork had been a prolific writer, espousing views
that were widely regarded as “conservative,” socially, economically and politically. He had been
a vocal critic of prior Supreme Court decisions on abortion and affirmative action. The result
was a Judiciary Committee hearing focused on Judge Bork’s likely views on these and other
“hot-button” issues. This focus was a radical departure from the traditional nomination hearings, which had involved deference to the President’s appointment powers, largely being limited
to an inquiry into the nominee’s qualifications: did the nominee go to a good law school, succeed in law school, serve well on a respected court, have a good professional reputation, etc.?
The questioning of Judge Bork was hostile; his responses were often contentious. The Judiciary Committee recommended against his nomination, and the full Senate rejected Judge
42
43

44

45

46

Rutkus, supra note 14, at 10-11 (noting that both Bush and Obama considered this quality necessary).
Statement of Senator Jon Kyl, Senate Hearing 111-1044: The Nomination of Elena Kagan to be an Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111shrg67622/html/
CHRG-111shrg67622.htm.
American Bar Association, ABA Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary: What It Is and
How it Works, 3 (2009) available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/
federal_judiciary/federal_judiciary09.authcheckdam.pdf.
Lee Epstein et al., The Role of Qualifications in the Confirmation of Nominees to the U.S. Supreme Court, 32
Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 1145, 1146-49 (2005), at 1148. The empirical study based an assessment of qualifications
on several factors, including the nominee rating produced by the ABA. Id. at 1158.
Elizabeth Rybicki, Supreme Court Nominations 43 (2010).
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Bork’s nomination on the stated grounds of “lack of judicial temperament,” rather than his personal beliefs on societal, economic or political issues.47
Judge Bork’s experience has chastened subsequent nominees in their approach to Senate
hearings and their willingness to discuss publicly their views on the significant social, political
and economic issues of the day. Since the “borking of Judge Bork,” subsequent nominees have
been increasingly guarded in their answers to questions, avoiding any public statements that
might reveal anything other than middle-of-the-road views. As one prominent Supreme Court
practitioner recently observed, “It has led to the process being a lot more opaque on what the
nominees are willing to say, and it’s had a chilling effect on people’s willingness to speak on topics generally if they think they might be candidates for nomination. . . . It creates a strange ritual
of senators asking substantive questions and nominees basically having to say they can’t answer
those questions. It has a ritualized Kabuki dance kind of element or aspect that I’d say makes for
a . . . different process.”48
Some legal scholars have called the current Supreme Court appointment process “broken,”
arguing that it has become so politicized that transparency has been lost. The Senate hearings
and media coverage have tended to focus on specific ideological issues like abortion, to the exclusion of competency, impartiality and judicial temperament. Critics base this argument on the
fact that the amount of media and interest-group attention on actual and prospective nominees
has grown, with extensive special interest group testimony occurring at Senate hearings.49
Other scholars have favorably noted that “controversy about individuals to serve as jurists is
both a longstanding feature of American politics and reflective of the role that law itself plays in
American politics.”50 This is because the Supreme Court has regularly handed down rulings that
address pressing social controversies, sometimes with 5-4 votes, reflecting the then prevailing
“conservative” vs. “liberal” complexion of the Court.51 Today, the public as well as the Senate
knows that social issues will be shaped by the Court: “Who the life-tenured judges are is a matter
of great political moment.”52
These realities have prompted increasing criticism of the lifetime appointment of Supreme
Court Justices. The United States’ establishment of life tenure is unique in the world. It permits
Justices to retire any time they wish, e.g., when an opening on the Court would be advantageous to a particular political party.53 Some speculate that Justice Stevens, generally regarded as
a “liberal Justice,” stayed on the Court until he was 90 years old so that President Obama (rather
47
48

49
50
51

52
53

Linda Chiem, Bork’s Failed High Court Bid Reshaped Judicial Vetting, Law360, Dec. 19, 2012.
Id. (quoting Christopher Landau of Kirkland & Ellis LLP); see also Dion Farganis & Justin Wedeking, No
Hints, No Forecasts, No Previews: Analyzing Supreme Court Nominee Evasiveness, 1955-2009, 45 U. Ken. L. &
Soc. R. 525, 554-55 (2011), available at http://www.uky.edu/~jpwede2/lawsocietycandor.pdf.
Epstein et al., supra note 45, at 1145, 1146-49.
Resnik, supra note 13, at 585.
Rutkus, supra note 14, at 5 & n. 16 (noting that liberals tend to favor this approach as addressing civil rights
issues that are mishandled by legislatures, while conservatives disfavor this approach as not contemplated by
the Constitution).
Resnik, supra note 13, at 588 (emphasis in the original).
Id. at 580.
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than President Bush) would nominate his successor, presumably someone more “liberal” than
President Bush was likely to have nominated.54
c) Diversity
As noted above, one critical condition for the effective operation of the rule of law is that all people have equal access to the legal system. This means not only that there should be no artificial
constraints on who can be a litigant, but that all people (regardless of race, religion, gender or
cultural background) have equal opportunity to serve in the judiciary. The reasoning is that a
diverse judiciary produces a more democratic application of the rule of law.55
Diversity of race and gender are qualifications that Presidents have increasingly focused
upon. President Obama emphasized the desire for diversity in his appointments to the Supreme
Court, nominating two women (one Hispanic).56 Earlier, President Reagan in appointing the
first woman to the Supreme Court (Justice Sandra Day O’Connor) said, “I made a commitment
that one of my first appointments to a Supreme Court vacancy would be the most qualified
woman that I could possibly find.”57

D. U.S. Supreme Court Lessons
The U.S. Supreme Court’s judicial selection and appointment process is relatively simple, with
its “checks and balances” approach of nomination by the Executive, with confirmation by the
Legislative branch. As such it is readily explainable to the general populace, thereby promoting
public interest and attention. And the transparency of the process (given a free press and evolution through education and press attention of the public interest in who is appointed), has
produced one of the most developed and effective legal systems in the world.
Indeed, the contentiousness of the recent appointments has had the positive effect of increasing public awareness and scrutiny of candidates. The net result is that the President’s reputation is affected by the choice of a nominee, as are the reputations of the Senators and overall
legislature by their/its handling of the nomination. As a consequence, there are incentives to
select and appoint highly qualified individuals, regardless of their specific political views or
party affiliations.
The key lesson is the importance of encouraging public awareness, interest and debate
about the process for selecting and appointing Supreme Court justices. This requires a trans54

55
56

57

Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Future of an Aging Court Raises Stakes of Presidential Vote, N.Y. Times, June 27, 2012,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/28/us/presidential-election-could-reshape-an-aging-supreme-court.html.
Resnik, supra note 13, at 591.
U.S. President (Obama, Barack H.), “Remarks on the Nomination of Sonia Sotomayor To Be a Supreme Court
Associate Justice,” Daily Compilation of Presidential Documents, May 26, 2009, DCPD-200900402, p. 1.
U.S. President (Reagan, Ronald W.), “Remarks Announcing the Intention To Nominate Sandra Day O’Connor To Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, July 7, 1981,” Public Papers of the
Presidents of the United States, Ronald Reagan, 1981 (Washington: GPO, 1982), p. 596.
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parent process and education of the public—by the press and in all levels of schooling—about
the importance of competent, independent and impartial judges, for the enhancement of the
economic development of the nation and the protection of individual rights.
A culture of free and open debate must be fostered for all this to occur. That starts with
early childhood education focusing on the value of judicial checks on executive and legislative
power. A culture of open discussion and debate is promoted by a free press that understands
the importance of the judicial selection process and its impact on the effective functioning of
the rule of law. A free press is critical to the transparency that best assures that the judges who
are appointed have the competence, independence and impartiality to maximize the probability
(and public perception) that judicial decisions will be made based on the published rules of law,
rather than political influence or economic corruption.
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II. The Judicial Selection and Appointment
Process in Various U.S. Individual States

W

hile the process for selecting and appointing U.S. Supreme Court Justices has been
widely praised, it is noteworthy that a number of individual states within the United
States have adopted materially different approaches for the selection and approval
of the judges for the “Supreme Court” of their states.58 That is significant because much of the
economic and criminal enforcement activity in the U.S. is governed by state, not federal law.
As can be seen in the chart below, thirteen states elect their Supreme Court judges in “nonpartisan” (i.e., no political-party affiliations) elections. Nine states use partisan elections, for a
total of twenty-two states (out of 51, counting the District of Columbia) with popularly elected
jurists. Twenty-three states (including the District of Columbia) begin their appointment process with some form of nominating commission. An additional 10 states use this process for
interim appointments only. Of the remaining six states, four (California, Maine, Massachusetts
and New Jersey) allow their governor to appoint, with either legislative or other executive approval. Two states (South Carolina and Virginia) ask their legislatures to select judges.59

Eighteen states have no retirement age. Thirty-two states (and the District of Columbia)
have mandatory retirement ages, variously set at 70, 72, 74 and 75, with one (Vermont) at 90.60
Some states allow judges to finish out the term for which they were elected or appointed.61 There
have been a number of efforts in various states to increase mandatory retirement ages, e.g., to
age 75 or 80.62
Notably, the various state alternatives to the U.S. Supreme Court model have not generated
any generally acknowledged improvements. Indeed, the independence of the judiciary in many
states has increasingly been called into question. “The independence of today’s state judges resembles that of their federal counterparts much less than it did at the Founding . . . [when] the
vast majority of state judges were selected and tenured much like federal judges . . . [T]here are

58

59

60

61
62

For a thorough overview of the various processes and perspectives, see Roy A. Schotland, New Challenges
to States’ Judicial Selection, 95 Geo. L.J. 1077 (2007), available at http://georgetown.lawreviewnetwork.com/
files/pdf/95-4/schotland.pdf.
American Judicature Society, Methods of Judicial Selection, http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/methods/selection_of_judges.cfm?state=.
Judgepedia, Mandatory Retirement, http://judgepedia.org/index.php/Mandatory_retirement (last visited
July 1, 2013) (a chart of retirement ages in each state and the constitutional provision or statute that mandates that age).
Id.; see e.g., Florida Constitution Art. V, Sec. 8.; Louisiana Constitution Art. V, Sec. 23.
Gavel to Gavel, A review of state legislation affecting the courts: Florida bill would raise mandatory judi
cial retirement age, (Feb. 14, 2013),http://gaveltogavel.us/site/2013/02/14/florida-bill-would-raise-mandatory-judicial-retirement-age-but-as-in-past-efforts-theres-a-catch/; John Caher, Assembly Bill Would
Raise Retirement Age for Judges, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 1, 2013, available at http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/
PubArticleNY.jsp?id=1202590476464&Assembly_Bill_Would_Raise_Retirement_Age_for_Judges&slreturn=20130316181407.
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almost no state judges today who enjoy life tenure, and almost all of them must run in some sort
of election or referendum before the public in order to win or keep their jobs.”63
The impetus for the various state experiments was the belief that the election of judges (and
other public officials) would make them responsive to the people and not to politicians, thus
enhancing their independence. However, a number of studies have concluded that the effect has
been to reduce the independence of state court judges. As one scholar has observed, “The overall
effect was to increase the governors’ and legislatures’ control over reappointment, and to weaken
judges’ power.”64
The states discussed below present a cross-section of the differing judicial selection processes existing amongst various individual states in the United States. .

A. Nominating Commissions with Gubernatorial Appointments
1. New York
Many in the United States regard New York as having a particularly good state judicial system.
Decisions of New York’s highest court (the N.Y. Court of Appeals) are often cited by courts of
other states, as respected precedents.
New York’s system for appointing justices to its Court of Appeals is instructive. New York
initially decided to elect its judges by popular vote. This was done in the belief that direct election of judges would bring the administration of justice under the control of the public, thereby
avoiding the perception that judges solely came from the “elite” of society, favoring the interests
of the wealthy over those of the public at large.
In 1977, New York rejected popular elections for its Court of Appeals judges, adopting a
system in which a nominating commission recommends candidates for appointment by New
York’s Governor. The impetus for the change was widespread dissatisfaction over a series of
what appeared to be heavily financed and ideologically partisan elections that, in the eyes of
many, raised questions about the competency, independence and impartiality of the judges being elected.65 A task force, including the head of the N.Y. State Bar Association, was appointed
by the Governor to study various approaches, ultimately making the recommendations adopted
in 1977.66
63

64

65
66

Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The Constitutionality of Federal Jurisdiction-Stripping Legislation and the History of
State Judicial Selection and Tenure, 98 Va. L. Rev. 839, 850, 853 (2012).
Michael J. Ellis, The Origins of the Elected Prosecutor, 121 Yale L.J. 1528, 1531 (2012) (“[R]eformers hoped
that popular elections for as many public offices as possible would place government in the hands of the
electorate and out of the control of political professionals.”); see also Jed H. Shugerman, Economic Crisis and
the Rise of Judicial Elections and Judicial Review, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 1061, 1063, 1075 (2010) (arguing that
judicial elections were a response to the financial crises of the 1830s and were intended to strengthen the
judicial review power of the courts against the profligate state legislatures).
Linda Greenhouse, State Senate Urges New Way to Select Judges, N.Y. Times, Mar. 23, 1976.
Daniel Becker & Malia Reddick, Judicial Selection Reform: Examples from Six States. Des
Moines, IA: American Judicature Society, 2003 22-23 (2003) (hereinafter “AJS6”).
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Selection Methods for State Supreme Court Judges
State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California

Elected
or
Partisan election

Gubernatorial appointment from nominating commission
Gubernatorial appointment from nominating commission
Nonpartisan election
Gubernatorial appointment, with confirmation by commission
on judicial appointments
Gubernatorial appointment from nominating commission
Gubernatorial nomination from judicial selection commission,
with legislative appointment
Gubernatorial appointment from judicial nominating
commission with senate consent
Presidential appointment from judicial nomination
commission, with senate confirmation
Gubernatorial appointment from nominating commission

Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of
Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire

Appointed

Nonpartisan election
Gubernatorial appointment from nominating commission with
senate confirmation
Nonpartisan election
Partisan election
Gubernatorial appointment from nominating commission
Gubernatorial appointment through nominating commission
Gubernatorial appointment from nominating commission
Nonpartisan election
Partisan election
Gubernatorial appointment with senate confirmation
Gubernatorial appointment from nominating commission with
senate confirmation
Gubernatorial appointment with approval of governor’s council
Partisan nomination
for nonpartisan
election
Nonpartisan election
Nonpartisan election
Gubernatorial appointment from nominating commission
Nonpartisan election
Gubernatorial appointment from nominating commission
Nonpartisan election
Gubernatorial nomination from selection commission
recommendation, with appointment by the executive council
Gubernatorial appointment with senate confirmation

New Jersey
New Mexico
New York

Partisan election

North Carolina
North Dakota

Nonpartisan election
Nonpartisan election

Gubernatorial appointment from nominating commission with
senate consent

continues
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Selection Methods for State Supreme Court Judges (continuation)
State
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah

Elected
or
Partisan primary for
nonpartisan general
election

Gubernatorial appointment through nominating commission
Nonpartisan election
Partisan election
Gubernatorial appointment from nominating commission with
house and senate confirmation
Legislative election
Gubernatorial appointment from nominating commission
Gubernatorial appointment from nominating commission
Partisan election
Gubernatorial appointment from nominating commission with
senate confirmation
Gubernatorial appointment from nominating commission with
senate confirmation

Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

Appointed

Legislative election
Nonpartisan election
Partisan election
Nonpartisan election
Gubernatorial appointment from nominating commission

New York created a “non-partisan” Judicial Nominations Commission consisting of twelve
members: four are appointed by the governor, four by the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals,
one each by the Legislative Assembly’s Speaker and Minority Leader, and one each by the Senate
President and Minority Leader. The four appointed by the Governor and Chief Judge must be
split along party lines and include two non-lawyers.67 The Commission is charged with preparing a list of persons who are “well qualified” for an opening on the Court of Appeals.68 This list
must be between three and seven candidates for a single vacancy.69 Once this work is completed,
the Governor may appoint, with the “advice and consent” of the state Senate,” a person from
among the names given.70
The New York Constitution requires that any appointee have practiced in New York for
at least ten years and been admitted to the N.Y. Bar for at least five years. It leaves further
qualifications to the Legislature.71 New York’s Judiciary Law obligates the Commission to select
candidates who “by their character, temperament, professional aptitude and experience are well
qualified to hold such judicial office.”72
67
68
69
70
71
72

N.Y. Const. art. VI § 2d(1).
Id. art. VI § 2d(4).
N.Y. Judiciary Law art. 3-A §63(2)(b), (3).
N.Y. Const. art. VI §2e.
Id. art. VI § 20a, c.
N.Y. Judiciary Law art. 3-A §63(1).
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There is no formal retention process. Judges’ terms are for fourteen years. They must apply
to be reappointed. The reappointment process is identical to the original appointment: essentially the judge goes through the full process again.
There have been some complaints that the Nominations Committee process has failed to
produce better candidates. Nominations have largely come from the ranks of New York’s lower
courts (which are still popularly elected), meaning that candidates maintain partisan affiliations. Another concern has been that the number of qualified applicants to be Court of Appeals
justices has fallen significantly. This has been largely attributable to the huge disparity between
the relative low pay for a Court of Appeals judge compared to the lucrative practice of private
law in NY,73 but has also been said to be, in part, “because it appeared that only a couple of candidates with close connections to the [Governor’s] administration had any real chance of being
selected.”74
Court of Appeals judges must retire at age 70 but can serve out their 70th year if their term
has not yet expired. There is pending legislation to increase the mandatory retirement age to 80
in recognition of increasing life spans and mental competency, as well as the difficulty New York
has experienced in finding qualified candidates, willing to serve. There are also efforts being
made to increase the pay of New York judges generally to be sure that New York maintains its
stature as a leader in the quality of its judiciary.

2. Arizona
Like New York, Arizona for many years had a popularly elected judiciary. In 1974, Arizona implemented a merit selection system, with retention elections every two years. This new system
is predicated on the belief that popular elections were overly politicizing the judicial branch.
The merit retention system still had a public election component, ostensibly informed by a poll
of Arizona lawyers, run by the state government. Each member of the Arizona Bar Association
was supposed to rate prospective judges based on their age, health, judicial integrity and competence in various areas of the law, with a recommendation on retention or nonrenewal. This system proved unpopular. Not all lawyers would fill out the questionnaires. The polls became more
about politics and connections than judicial temperament, competence and independence. Further, the public was not well informed of the results of the lawyers’ ratings.
A 1989 task force on Arizona’s courts concluded that “most voters never learn the results of
the bar poll” and, given the widespread public distrust of the Bar Association, those that did pay
attention declined to take the poll results seriously.75 As a result, not a single judge lost a retention election for the eighteen years between 1974 and 1992. In 1988, based on these complaints,
the Chief Justice of the Arizona Supreme Court appointed a commission to make recommendations, resulting in the system in place today.
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Arizona (like New York) now uses a nominating commission to select its Supreme Court
judges. The Arizona Nominating Commission is headed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court. It includes five attorney members, chosen by the state Bar Association, and 10 non-attorney members appointed by the Governor “with the advice and consent of the [Arizona] Senate.”
Membership must be evenly split between Democrats and Republicans. The Commission constantly rotates, with members serving staggered four-year terms.76
When there is a vacancy on the Arizona Supreme Court, the Commission submits a list of
at least three names (with people from both political parties) to the Governor. The Governor
is empowered to appoint a Justice within 60 days (after 60 days, the Chief Justice may choose
between the nominees on the basis of merit alone).77
Arizona then requires the justice to run in an election after the first two years in office, and
again every six years thereafter, to continue to serve. The justices do not face any opposition;
voters choose only whether to retain individual judges. Any resulting vacancies are filled by the
process described above.78
Arizona implemented a system for assessing judicial performance to give the public “a full
and fair opportunity for participation in the evaluation process through public hearings, dissemination of evaluation reports to voters and any other methods as the court deems advisable.”79 To that end, the Supreme Court is authorized to appoint a total of thirty members to the
Commission on Judicial Performance Review (“CJPR”), whose job it is to evaluate judges and
disseminate that information. The Performance Commission conducts two evaluations in each
judicial cycle, one midway through the judge’s term and again just before a retention election.
The midway evaluation is given only to the judge and is designed to promote improvement; the
retention evaluation is made public. To assemble this survey, the CJPR surveys both lawyers
and non-lawyers who have appeared or otherwise interacted with the judge in question. Those
surveys are collected and transcribed anonymously to form the written reports presented to the
public. 80
To be an Arizona Supreme Court justice, one must “be a person of good moral character
and admitted to the practice of law in and a resident of the state of Arizona for ten years next
preceding his taking office.”81 The goal of Arizona’s Nominating Commission is “to select judges
who have outstanding professional competence and reputation and who are also sensitive to the
needs of and held in high esteem by the communities they serve and who reflect, to the extent
possible, the ethnic, racial and gender diversity of those communities.”82 Arizona (like 20 other
states) requires its judges to retire at age 70.
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The main criticism of Arizona’s selection system is that neither the press nor the public have
paid much attention, with the result that voting remains uninformed. The CJPR has “struggled
to find the best distribution method for the results,” with only 30 percent of voters even knowing
about the existence of the program. Voter apathy has made it difficult to attract high-quality
judges. Arizona voters have retained multiple judges whose abilities were severely questioned
by CJPR.83
Notably, in the many states with similar retention by popular-election systems, very small
fractions of judges facing a vote have lost their bid for retention.84 Indeed, the most remarkable
fact about retention elections in the United States is that they are largely ignored. Between 1936
and 2009, 637 state Supreme Court judges faced retention elections, with 629 being retained.85
The few who were not retained lost their election largely because of “hot button” issues like
abortion, gay marriage, or the death penalty.86

B. Direct Elections of Justices
1. Texas
Texas, like many other states, elects its Supreme Court judges through partisan elections, with
mandatory retirement at age 75. Texas Supreme Court judges must be U.S. citizens, residents of
Texas, have practiced law for at least 10 years and be at least 35 years old.87
Texas is unique in the U.S. in having two highest courts: the Court of Criminal Appeals,
which handles all criminal matters, and a separate Supreme Court for all other matters. Judges
for both courts are elected for six-year terms. The only exception to this comes when a vacancy
occurs by retirement or otherwise, in which case the Texas Governor is authorized to appoint
someone to fill the post, until the next statewide popular election occurs.88
Texas’ partisan election system has been widely criticized. Rather than resulting in an independent and responsive judiciary, the system has seen the cost of campaigns skyrocket, with “an
increased focus on the players behind the scenes who paid for pricey campaigns.”89 As a leading
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only two judges have failed retention elections since 1948, and in Illinois less than 2% of judges have failed
even since it raised the retention requirement to 60% of the vote).
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tem, ABA J. (Jan. 1, 2011), available at http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/landmark_iowa_elections_send_tremor_through_judicial_retention_system/.
A.Z. Sulzberger, In Iowa, Voters Oust Judges Over Marriage Issue, N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 2010, available at
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judicial elections authority has observed, “[T]he election of Texas Supreme Court justices [has]
become a battleground for plaintiff and defense lawyers.”90
All legislative efforts to move to a U.S. Supreme Court-type system have failed. One effort
at reform was the Judicial Campaign Fairness Act (“JCFA”) of 1995.91 The JCFA passed a limit
of $5,000, for both individuals and law firms, on donations to campaigns for a position on
the Texas Supreme Court and imposed disclosure requirements for any organization spending
more than $5000 in support of any candidate.92 The JCFA has reduced the total amount spent on
elections in recent years, but “the perception that justice is for sale has lingered.”93

2. Mississippi
Mississippi selects its Supreme Court judges through a nonpartisan election process. Candidates are precluded from affiliating themselves with any political party, either on the ballot or
while campaigning. Although they hold office “from their state at large,” Mississippi Supreme
Court judges are locally elected from three different geographic districts, for eight-year terms.
Candidates must have practiced law and lived in Mississippi for at least five years, and be at least
30 years of age. There is no mandatory retirement age.94
Critics of nonpartisan elections have pointed out that, in the absence of any political party
identification, there is generalized public apathy. Voters tend to focus on factors like the candidate’s race, gender, nickname and location on the ballot, with the result that special interests
(like the personal injury trial lawyer’s associations) influence judicial races regardless of their
claimed nonpartisan nature. Potential judges are all the more beholden to individual contributors and special interest groups, and even less independent.95
Nonpartisan elections are described by one commentator as “possess[ing] all of the vices
of partisan elections and none of the virtues.”96 Indeed, Mississippi has a widespread reputation
for highly politicized rulings favoring the Mississippi personal injury lawyers who finance most
judges’ elections.97
It is significant that, in 1993, a Mississippi judicial-reform task force recommended that
the state implement a nomination and confirmation process like that for U.S. Supreme Court.98
90
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That proposal was rejected and the present Mississippi system implemented, based upon strong
lobbying by the Mass Tort and Medical Malpractice Plaintiffs Lawyers Association. As a consequence, Mississippi’s “reform” has not significantly altered the existing system, except that partisan organizations like the Trial Lawyers’ Association have become more influential in judicial
elections than they were before.99

C. Legislative Appointment
The South Carolina legislature (its General Assembly) has long been empowered to select the
state’s Supreme Court judges. They are appointed for 10-year terms, subject to retirement at age
72. Each 10 year term is considered separate; judges may apply for reappointment and there is
no formal retention process. Judges must be U.S. citizens, at least 32 years old, been licensed
as attorneys for at least eight years, and have been South Carolina residents for five or more
years.100
South Carolina’s current legislative appointment process is a response to many complaints
in the 1990s that the state’s judicial system lacked any independence from the legislature, which
was itself highly politicized and “inbred” (all the Supreme Court justices were former S.C. legislators).101 Now, in making its appointments, the General Assembly is required to consult with
three separate entities. The first, and most important, is the Judicial Merit Selection Commission
(“JMSC”). The JMSC conducts the initial screening of Supreme Court candidates. The JMSC has
10 members, five of whom are selected by the Speaker of the House, three of whom are appointed by the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, and two by the President Pro Tempore
of the Senate. Six members must be representatives, and four must be from the general public.102
When a vacancy opens, the JMSC screens candidates and sends a list of nominees from
which the General Assembly must choose. To do so, the Committee sends questionnaires to all
members of the South Carolina Bar, interviews all candidates, and reviews their written statements, published writings, and past records (including criminal and financial matters in addition to academic and any judicial histories). After reviewing these materials, the Committee
holds public hearings on prospective judges’ qualifications.103
The second body is the Citizens Committee on Judicial Qualifications (“CCJQ”). The CCJQ
is designed to increase public participation in the selection and retention of judges. Its stated goal
is for “all South Carolinians [to] have a voice in the selection of … judges.” The CCJQ is in fact
five different committees of ten people who are selected by the immediate past regional chairman.
Each committee picks its own regional chairman for each session. Each CCJQ reports on all candidates in its region, theoretically assisting the JMSC in its recommendation-making process.104
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The third entity involved is the South Carolina Bar Association’s Judicial Qualifications
Committee. That Committee produces biannual reports rating all candidates, based on interviews with lawyers and others who have interacted with the candidates. The Committee rates
each judge as well qualified, qualified or not qualified. The ratings are published on the Bar
Association’s website.105
The South Carolina legislative approach to judicial selection has been roundly criticized
as assuring the politicization of judges and undermining their independence. The complicated
overlay of the various consultative bodies has had no apparent positive effect. Some studies have
commented upon the lack of quality and independence of South Carolina’s highest court, noting
the S.C. Supreme Court’s disregard of politically unpopular (in South Carolina) U.S. Supreme
Court precedents on due process and other issues.106
Recent additional reforms have been proposed. The critics of the South Carolina appointment system note that “members of the legislature, many of whom are lawyers who may appear
before that judge in the future, select and then fund the judiciary.” The critics say that this is “a
clear violation of the three independent branches of government we all learned about in third
grade.” The current proposal would have the Governor present three candidates, with the state
Senate voting to select one of the three.107

D. Gubernatorial Appointment with Legislative Confirmation
1. California
California is the United States’ largest and most economically important state. California has a
complex process for appointing its Supreme Court Justices, with interactions amongst the state’s
Governor, a Commission on Judicial Appointments, and California voters. The state adopted
this system in 1934 after years of dissatisfaction with the quality of judges produced by partisan
elections.108
Judicial candidates must have been state bar members or judges for at least ten years. Supreme Court justices are initially appointed for 12-year terms, with retention elections at the
expiration of a term. There is no competing opponent in any retention election. There is no
mandatory retirement age in California.
California’s Governor appoints justices of the Supreme Court but that decision is only effective when confirmed by the Commission on Judicial Appointments. The Commission is
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a three-person panel consisting of the Chief Justice, the Attorney General, and the presiding
judge who has served for the longest time on the state’s intermediate appellate courts.109
In making a nomination, the Governor is guided by the recommendations of a Commission on Judicial Nominees Evaluation.110 That Commission is charged with “confidentially” investigating and evaluating judicial qualifications of candidates identified by the Governor. The
Commission consists of 27 to 38 people, at least 80 percent of whom must be active members
of the California Bar. Members are appointed by the Board of Trustees of the State Bar of California. They may not endorse nor participate in any candidate’s retention campaigns, nor seek
appointment themselves.
In reviewing candidates, the Evaluation Commission considers an application for appointment from the Governor, past application materials, state bar records, and information from
former colleagues, area attorneys and other knowledgeable parties, on the qualifications of each
nominee. The Commission ranks candidates based on their qualifications, focusing on the attributes of “collegiality, writing ability, scholarship, distinction in the profession, and breadth and
depth of experience.” The Governor is not bound by these evaluations, but must at least consider
their findings.111
This process applies to two distinct vacancy situations. In one, a judge declines to seek reelection at the expiration of his or her term. In that case, the Governor is charged with nominating someone to succeed the retiring judge. If selected, that person must then seek election in the
next general election. In the second situation, a judge either vacates the position in the middle
of the term (most often due to early retirement or death), or fails to win a retention election. If
this occurs, the Governor may appoint a judge to fill the seat until the next general election.112

2. New Jersey
Following the U.S. Supreme Court model, New Jersey gives its Governor the power to appoint
justices to the state’s Supreme Court, with the “advice and consent of the [New Jersey] Senate.”
The New Jersey Constitution requires that all judges have been admitted to practice law in New
Jersey for at least ten years prior to their appointment.113
By executive order, the Governor appoints a Judicial Advisory Panel whose mission it is to
“review the background and abilities of potential nominees to the judiciary.” The Panel consists
of seven members, appointed by the Governor for five-year terms. Five or more of the Panel
members must be retired judges. The Governor is expected to “rely heavily” on the Panel’s evaluations in making nominations for approval by the Senate.114
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The Senate in turn has the benefit of a formal oversight process provided by the New Jersey
State Bar Association. According to a compact renewed with each Governor, the Bar Association reviews the qualifications of candidates, confidentially reporting its findings to the Governor. This review is conducted by a twenty-six-member Judicial and Prosecutorial Appointments
Committee. The motivation for this agreement was to encourage the nonpartisan vetting of
candidates and to improve the quality of New Jersey’s judiciary.115
The N.J. Bar has set forth the following criteria for a desirable judge:
1.

Undisputed integrity;

2.

A high degree of knowledge of established legal principles and procedures, and a high
degree of ability to interpret and apply them to factual situations;

3.

That they have been a licensed attorney in New Jersey for at least 10 years;

4.

An appropriate judicial temperament, which includes common sense, compassion,
decisiveness, firmness, humility, open-mindedness, patience, tact and understanding;

5.

A commitment to diligence, punctuality and effective management skills;

6.

The requisite physical and mental abilities to be able to perform the essential functions
of the job;

7.

Demonstrated financial responsibility; and

8.

Demonstrated participation in public service activities.116

Justices of the Supreme Court are appointed to initial seven-year terms. After that, they
must go through the full nomination process, as described above, one time before being granted
permanent appointments, “on good behavior,” subject to mandatory retirement at age 70. By
tradition, honored by all Governors to date, three of the Supreme Court’s members must be
from the Republican Party and three from the Democratic Party.117

E. Lessons from the Individual U.S. States
As demonstrated, various individual states in the United States have experimented with a number of different methods for selecting their highest court judges. It is instructive that the approaches deviating from the U.S. Supreme Court model (like in Texas, Mississippi and South
Carolina) have been criticized for their ineffectiveness in producing greater independence, impartiality or overall quality in their respective judiciaries. And it is significant that states like
New York and California have been gravitating back towards the U.S. Supreme Court process
and balanced executive nomination with a legislative appointment approach, as adopted by
New Jersey.
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The popular-election and legislative-appointment models of Texas and South Carolina, respectively, have been consistently found to politicize the judiciary. In some instances the line
between politicization and corruption is blurred, as demonstrated by the recent case of a Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice who was convicted of corruption by a jury for ordering her staff
to work on her electoral campaign.118
The various nominating commissions that have been created by California and New York
add complexity without necessarily enhancing the quality of the judiciary, or the transparency
of the process. If anything, it dilutes press and public interest based on its complexity and the
(false) appearance that “the professional experts” are protecting the public interest.
As we saw in the discussion on the U.S. Supreme Court process, meaningful transparency
is the product of an interested populace and an active free press. That assures an open airing
of multiple perspectives and promotes the essential element for successful implementation of
the rule of law: the public’s awareness of the importance to the society of who is selected and
retained—and why—to be the ultimate arbiters of how a nation’s laws are to be interpreted and
enforced.
As noted before, that is an evolutionary development requiring active promotion by the
press and educators at all levels of the school system, from early grade school through law and
other graduate schools. It is, in reality and of necessity, a bottom-up process based on the citizenry’s self-interest in greater individual and economic freedom. The press and public must
demand, at the ballot box and otherwise, that the nation’s government itself become committed
to the rule of law, with due process for all.
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III. Selected International Processes

M

any different approaches to the selection and appointment of Supreme Court justices
exist around the rest of the world. The following is a sampling of differing systems
that have evolved in Europe and Asia.

A. Japan
The Japanese Supreme Court itself selects and promotes future judges. While at first it seems
that such a system would be insulated from political influence (that was in fact the intent when
the system was adopted after World War II), this has not been the result.119
Many scholars have suggested that the Supreme Court of Japan uses its administrative powers to further the political agenda of the governing Liberal Democratic Party, resulting in a stagnation of the legal system.120 The Supreme Court almost never overrules governmental determinations, consistently deferring to the actions of the ruling party. Since its creation over seventy
years ago, the Supreme Court has only struck down eight statutes on constitutional grounds.121
The Liberal Democratic Party took power nearly half a century ago. It has a firm hold on
who is a part of (and is promoted within) the judicial system. The highest ranks of the judiciary
are made up entirely of those who support the party’s conservative political ideology. As party
members are the ones who select candidates for promotion within the judicial system, the system is self perpetuating, with no transparency.122
This has been the case since the early 1970s. Back then a “young” liberal judge ruled that a
government-proposed military facility could not be built on forest land because the existence of
the military was unconstitutional. The judge disclosed that he had received a letter from a higher-ranking judge suggesting that it would be wiser to rule for the government. The legislative
committee to impeach judges promptly convened, resulting in the junior judge’s reprimand for
disclosing the letter and the senior judge’s complete exoneration. Shortly thereafter, many liberal
judges resigned under pressure from senior judges, with the Supreme Court denying appointments to several members of a liberal political party.123
Thus while in theory there are seats on the Supreme Court reserved for less-conservative
members of the bar, these seats are typically not filled by liberal candidates. Even if a liberal
judge reaches the Supreme Court, that judge is certain to be outvoted on every issue.124
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There have been calls for reform of the Japanese judicial appointment system. Over a decade
ago, the government created the Judicial System Reform Council to examine the effectiveness
of Japan’s judicial system. The Council found that “the processes for nomination by the Cabinet
and for appointment are not necessarily transparent, and problems have been pointed out, such
as the entrenchment of fixed proportions for the numbers of justices who come from each field.”
Given the importance of Supreme Court judges, it recommended that “appropriate measures…
be considered to secure a transparent and objective process for their appointment.”125
That report did prompt a change in the system for appointing lower-court judges. In 2003,
the Japanese Supreme Court established a Lower Court Judge Designation Consultation Commission, composed of non-current judiciary members, to review candidates for appointment as
lower-court judges. The minutes of the selection meetings are made public. While this would
seem to be an improvement in transparency, this has not been the case. The reports are short,
largely formulaic, with no statement of the reasons for selections or denials of appointments,
beyond qualified or not. And, again, the Commission is dominated by Liberal Democratic Party
members.126
The stated selection criteria for new judges (and for reappointment) include law school
grades, recommendations from law professors (by tradition, retired former judges), opinions of
the chief judge where the candidate has worked, and softer personality traits like “cautiousness.”
There is no transparency; neither the public nor the press is given access to the decisionmaking
process. Despite calls to make these standards clearer and more precise, the Committee has
determined that confidentiality in the reasons for selection (or rejection) of candidates is paramount, refusing to open up the process to public scrutiny.127
The lesson from the Japanese approach is summed up well by one legal scholar’s observation: “There is no plausible way of designing or structuring a court so as to insulate it entirely
from political influence.”128
As discussed above, transparency is essential. It assures that competing ideologies have an
opportunity to influence the process, with each side having an incentive to be a watchdog to
expose questions regarding the competence, independence, impartiality and judicial temperament of prospective Supreme Court justices.
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As noted already, transparency is most effective when there is press and public awareness
of the importance to the economic success of the nation and the rights of its citizenry of having
a system governed by the rule of law, enforced by competent and independent judges. Creating
such a culture does not happen overnight, but rather is a process of educating the citizenry from
an early age and fostering open political debate through demands for and a governmental commitment to freedom of the press and speech.

B. England
The United Kingdom has a long-established judicial system that promotes the rule of law but
(like Japan) England has long had an insular, non-public system of judicial appointments. Until
recently, “the power to appoint judges . . . vested in the Lord Chancellor.”129
The Lord Chancellor was appointed by Her (or His) Majesty, on the advice of the Prime
Minister of England’s Parliament. The Lord Chancellor was both the head of the judiciary of
England and the presiding officer of the House of Lords, the upper and Sovereign-appointed
chamber of Parliament which had final say on all major legal and other matters.130 In deciding whom to appoint to a vacant judicial post, the Lord Chancellor would use “stringent (but
unstated) eligibility criteria and ‘secret soundings’—a process of anonymous consultation with
unnamed sitting judges.”131
Dissatisfaction with the Lord Chancellor’s control of the judiciary led to Parliament passing
a comprehensive Constitutional Reform Act, in 2005.132 The Reform Act addressed two issues.
First was the perceived need for a more independent judiciary. To that end, several structural
reforms were enacted to create a clear separation of powers between the legislature and the
judiciary. The Act established the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom as the highest court,
taking over the role of the House of Lords. The Act also designated the Lord Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court as the head of the judiciary—a position previously held by the Lord Chancellor.133 The Supreme Court is composed of a president (the Chief Justice), a deputy president,
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the-judiciary-in-detail/judicial+roles/judges/lord-chief-justice. As head of the judiciary, “[t]he Lord Chief
Justice decides where judges sit, and the type of cases they hear.” How the judiciary is governed, Judiciary of England and Wales, http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/about-the-judiciary/the-judiciary-in-detail/
how-the-judiciary-is-governed.
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and ten justices.134 It is the final court of appeal for all civil cases in the UK and for all criminal
cases in England, Wales and Northern Ireland.135
Second, the 2005 Reform Act redesigned the process by which members of the judiciary are
appointed. This change was prompted by the recognition that “the composition of the English
bench is woefully unrepresentative of the nation’s population.” The Act “create[d] both an independent body charged with judicial selection and an ombudsman to handle complaints about
the appointments process.”136 The intent was to provide transparency and thereby “strengthen
judicial independence by taking responsibility for selecting candidates . . . out of the hands of
the Lord Chancellor and making the appointments process clearer and more accountable.”137
The Reform Act created the Judicial Appointments Commission (the “JAC”), as an independent, non-governmental institution. The JAC was intended to be “independent of political
patronage.” It handles selection for the Supreme Court as well as about nine hundred judicial
positions, including both full- and part-time lower-court appointments.138
The JAC is composed of a chair and fourteen commissioners. The chair must be a lay person. Of the 14 commissioners, five must be members of the judiciary, but a majority must be
laypersons. Those five judicial members must come from all levels of the court system. Commissioners serve initial terms of up to five years, with a maximum of 10 years’ service. Appointment
to the JAC is formally made by the Sovereign on recommendation of the Lord Chancellor, but
there are significant limitations on who may be chosen.139 “All are recruited and appointed
through open competition with the exception of three judicial members who are selected by the
Judges’ Council.”140 This open application process focuses on “selflessness, integrity, objectivity,
accountability, openness, honesty, and leadership.”141
The Reform Act also created a Judicial Appointments and Conduct Ombudsman. The Ombudsman is responsible for handling complaints about judicial appointments. He or she accepts
written complaints, investigates and considers any issues, and is empowered to take appropriate
action to rectify any problems.142
The Reform Act mandates that, in selecting individuals to fill a vacant judicial post, the
JAC’s decision must be solely on merit—no other consideration may be considered in appointing an applicant to the bench. The JAC has formally established a set of attributes it uses to as134
135
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Constitutional Reform Act, 2005, c. 4, pt. 3, ¶¶ 23(2), 23(5), 23(6).
The Supreme Court, http://www.supremecourt.gov.uk/.
Maute, supra note 129, at 390, 393.
About the JAC, Judicial Appointments Commission, http://jac.judiciary.gov.uk/about-jac/about-jac.htm.
Maute, supra note 129, at 390, 410.
Constitutional Reform Act, 2005, c. 4, § 61, sch. 12, ¶¶ 1, 2, 2.2(a), 2.2(c),, 2.4(3), 7(1)-7(3), 10(2)(a), 10(2)
(b), 13-14, 16.
About the JAC, Judicial Appointments Commission, http://jac.judiciary.gov.uk/about-jac/about-jac.htm.
Maute, supra note 129, at 412; see also Constitutional Reform Act of 2005, c. 4, § 61, sch. 12, ¶¶ 8-10.
See Making a Complaint, Judicial Appointments Commission, http://jac.judiciary.gov.uk/about-jac/complaints.htm; Judicial Appointments and Conduct Ombudsman Homepage, Justice, http://www.justice.gov.
uk/about/jaco.
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JAC’s Considerations:
• Intellectual Capacity
• Personal Qualities
• Ability to Understand and
Deal Fairly with Litigants and
Disputes

sess merit. These include intellectual capacity, personal
qualities, an ability to understand and deal fairly with
litigants and disputes, authority, communication skills,
and efficiency.143 The Act further mandates that selection will only be made if the person is of good character.
Finally, diversity on the bench is encouraged, subject to
considerations of merit.144

The appointment process varies slightly depending
on whether the vacant post is at the Supreme Court or an
• Communication Skills
inferior court. When a vacancy occurs at the Supreme
Court, the Lord Chancellor must convene a selection
• Efficiency
commission. That commission consists of the president
and deputy president of the Supreme Court, one member of the JAC, one member of the Judicial
Appointments Board for Scotland, and one member of the Northern Ireland Judicial Appointments Commission. The selection commission submits a report to the Lord Chancellor, making
a recommendation which the Lord Chancellor may accept, reject, or require reconsideration of
the nomination. Once the Lord Chancellor accepts a selection, he notifies the Prime Minister,
who then recommends that nominee to the Sovereign for appointment (a mere formality). Selection to fill the vacancy must be based on merit, and no person on the commission may be
selected. A highly similar process is used in the selection of the Lord Chief Justice.145
• Authority

Appointees to the Supreme Court must have held high judicial office for at least two years
or have held rights of audience as barristers at the higher courts of England, Scotland, or Northern Ireland for at least 15 years.146 “A judge of the Supreme Court holds that office during good
behavior”147—that is, for life, subject to the requirement that all members of the judiciary leave
the bench when they turn 70.148 The protection of tenure during good behavior is deemed important to independence as any legal professional “who has taken a salaried role will not be able
to return to legal practice.”149
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Qualities and Abilities, Judicial Appointment Commission, http://jac.judiciary.gov.uk/application-process/112.htm.
Constitutional Reform Act of 2005, c. 4, § 61, sch. 12, ¶¶ 63(2)-(3), 64(1)-(2).
Id. c. 4, sch. 8, pt. 3 §§ 29(2), 29(6), 26(3), 27(5), 27(7); c. 2, pt. 4 §§ 67-75. “Heads of Division” refers to the
Master of the Rolls, the President of the Queen’s Bench Division, the President of the Family Division, and
the Chancellor of the High Court.
Constitutional Reform Act of 2005, c. 4, pt. 3, § 25. “High Judicial Office” includes seats on the Supreme
Court, the Court of Appeal, the High Court, the Northern Irish High Court, the Northern Irish High Court
of Appeal, or the Scottish Court of Session.
Constitutional Reform Act, 2005, c. 4, pt. 3 ¶ 33.
Judicial Pensions and Retirement Act, 1993, c. 8, pt. 26, § 1. However, if the “appropriate Minister” (most
likely the Lord Chancellor, though the statute does not specify) finds that it is in the public interest for the
jurist to continue in office after age seventy, he may authorize the person to continue to serve until the jurist
is seventy-five. Id. § 5.
Becoming a judge, Judiciary of England and Wales, http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/about-the-judiciary/judges-magistrates-and-tribunal-judges/judges-career-paths/becoming-a-judge.htm?wbc_purpose=Basic.rss.
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Under U.K. law, a member of the judiciary may be disciplined, suspended, or removed from
his or her post “[i]n cases where the judge’s conduct is seriously impugned.” A presiding judge
may refer any such matter to the Lord Chief Justice and Lord Chancellor.” Those two officials
“are jointly responsible for considering and determining complaints about the personal conduct
of all judges in England and Wales.”150 An Office for Judicial Complaints was created to “provide
advice and assistance” to these two officials.
The Lord Chief Justice (with the consent of the Lord Chancellor) has largely unfettered
disciplinary powers, both formal and informal. He or she may speak to any member of the judiciary informally.151 The Chief Justice also has the authority to “give a judicial office holder formal
advice, or a formal warning or reprimand, for disciplinary purposes.” The Chief Justice may also
“suspend a person from a judicial office for any period during which” the person “is subject to
criminal proceedings,” “is serving a sentence imposed in criminal proceedings,” or “has been
convicted of an offence and is subject to prescribed procedures in relation to the conduct constituting the offence.”152
The circumstances in which a judge may be removed are much more circumscribed. “Since
the Act of Settlement it has only been possible to remove a senior judge from office through
an Address to the Queen agreed by both Houses of Parliament.”153 The Lord Chief Justice and
the Lord Chancellor do have the power to refer a judge to the Office for Judicial Complaints to
assess whether removal is appropriate and recommend a course of action. However, the exercise
of the removal power is exceedingly rare: it has never occurred in England and Wales and has
been used only once, “when Sir Jonah Barrington was removed from office as a judge of the Irish
High Court of Admiralty in 1830 for corruption.”154
While the formal qualifications and appointment procedures discussed above are important to understanding how the UK courts select members of their judiciary, the practical effect
of this system largely remains to be seen. The current system has only been in place since 2005.
The Supreme Court and England’s other highest courts are still dominated by senior barristers
known in British parlance as “Queen’s Counsel.”155
Appointment as Queen’s Counsel is an honor attained by only about 150 lawyers per year
and reserved for “the most elite group of senior” lawyers. Because an appointee to the Supreme
150
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Judicial conduct, Judiciary of England and Wales, http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/about-the-judiciary/the-judiciary-in-detail/jud-acc-ind/jud-conduct.htm?wbc_purpose=Basic&WBCMODE=PresentationUnpu.
Constitutional Reform Act, 2005, c. 4, § 108(3) (“[B]ut this section does not restrict what he may do informally or for other purposes or where any advice or warning is not addressed to a particular office holder.”).
Id. § 108(4), (6). Suspension differs from removal in that “[w]hile a person is suspended under this section
from any office he may not perform any of the functions of the office (but his other rights as holder of the
office are not affected).” Id. § 108(8).
Independence, Judiciary of England and Wales, http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/about-the-judiciary/
the-judiciary-in-detail/jud-acc-ind/independence. An address is roughly equivalent to an impeachment
proceeding in the United States’ federal court system. See Senior Courts Act, 1981, ch. 54, pt. 1, § 11.
Judges and parliament, Judiciary of England and Wales, http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/about-the-judiciary/the-judiciary-in-detail/jud-acc-ind/judges-and-parliament.
See Maute, supra note 129, at 410-11 (“Because the JAC is new, there were not established procedure in place
to select the first commissioners.”); id. at 419-22.
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or any other English court may not return to private practice and the judges are paid substantially less than the income of a successful barrister, judicial applicants tend to self-select for
those who are in the later stages of their career.
Thus, the English judiciary consists largely of older barristers who had successful private
practices and have turned to the judiciary out of a sense of duty and the long-established tradition of successful barristers “retiring” by becoming judges.156 As a consequence, the World
Justice Project has observed, “While the court system is independent and free of undue influence, it is not as accessible and affordable as others in the region.”157
The lesson from England for Latin America is the importance of avoiding the notion that
the judiciary itself should appoint its successors in a non-transparent process. The British reforms expressly recognize that transparency is essential to a more open and independent judiciary, one that is perceived as fair to the entire populace.

C. Germany
Germany, in contrast to the United States and other common law countries like Japan and England, has a civil law system. As a consequence, Germany relies on a combination of professional, civil service judges and so-called “lay” judges (private citizens acting in a judicial capacity)
for most legal disputes. Supervising these judges are numerous specialized courts of appeal focusing on different fields of law, with a Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht)
occupying the highest status, but tasked only with the narrow duty of judicial review of constitutional matters.158
“Specifically designated authorities” ask questions of the Constitutional Court, which renders final answers. The Court is formally detached from all three branches of the German government. The Constitutional Court provides “advisory opinions,” reviewing laws “in the abstract” and, thus, “eliminate[ing] unconstitutional legislation and practices before they can do
harm.” The metric against which laws are measured is the Basic Rights of the Federal Constitution.159
The jurisdiction of the German Constitutional Court is invoked in three ways:
■■
156

157
158

159

Constitutional Complaints (Verfassungsbeschwerden): “This is [a]n extraordinary rem-

Queen’s Counsel in England and Wales, 2011-12, Justice, http://www.justice.gov.uk/news/press-releases/
moj/queens-counsel-in-england-and-wales,-2011-12 (click “Queen’s Counsel statistics 1995-12” link). For
a discussion of the selection procedure, see Background to QC Appointments, Queen’s Counsel Appointments, http://www.qcappointments.org/?page_id=36; Salary, Judiciary of England and Wales, http://
www.judiciary.gov.uk/about-the-judiciary/judges-magistrates-and-tribunal-judges/terms-of-service/salary
(“[I]t is worth noting that a successful solicitor or barrister from a top firm or Chambers can earn many
times more than even a senior judge.”).
WJP 2013, supra note 2, at 22.
German Judiciary Act, §5, available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_drig/englisch_drig.html#p0009.
See Alec Stone Sweet, Constitutional Courts in Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional
Law 3 (2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1913658.

The selection of high-level judges in the United States, Europe and Asia / 31

edy open to individual citizens. Any person (and to some extent also a private corporation) can petition the Constitutional Court directly and personally to declare a federal
or state statute unconstitutional and void, to set aside an executive act or to reverse the
decision of any other court, on the ground that the challenged act violates a right guaranteed to him in the Bill of Rights.”
■■

■■

Requests by Ordinary Courts (konkrete Normenkontrollen): “Every court has the right
and duty to pass on the constitutionality of an applicable statute, but it may only proceed to judgment forthwith if it comes to the conclusion that the statute is constitutional. Otherwise, it must, under express constitutional mandate, stay the proceedings and
refer the issue to the Constitutional Court.”
Petitions by the Federal Government, a state government (Land), or one-third of the
membership of Parliament (Bundestag) to declare a federal or state statute unconstitutional and void (abstrakte Normenkontrollen): “Decisions of the Federal Constitutional
Court are binding on all other courts and government instrumentalities. Moreover,
every decision reviewing the constitutionality of a statute has itself the force of statute
and is published in the Official Gazette (Bundesgesetzblatt).”160

The Constitutional Court is divided into two “Senates,” each of which possesses a mutually
exclusive jurisdiction. Both the First and Second Senates have eight members, for a total of sixteen
on the Court. The Court’s president serves on one Senate while the vice president serves on the
other. The two-Senate system was instituted in response to a debate over whether the Court would
function primarily in a traditional legal capacity or if it would act in a more political role.161
As originally conceived, the First Senate would review the constitutionality of laws and hear
cases arising out of ordinary litigation, while the Second Senate would hear the more “political”
cases and disputes between branches and levels of government. To distribute the caseload more
evenly, however, much of the First Senate’s work was passed on to the Second Senate, blurring
the line between the responsibilities of the two.162
Appointment to the Constitutional Court is a confidential process. It is “highly politicized.”163
Judges are appointed to the Court by the federal legislature. The two German legislative bodies
each elect half of the judges: the Bundestag (composed of members directly elected by the people) and the Bundesrat (composed of members selected by state governments). In the case of the
160
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Wiltraut Rupp-Brünneck, Admonitory Functions of Constitutional Courts, 20 Am. J. Comp. L. 387, 389-92
(1972) (“The question whether or not a statute is in accordance with the Constitution may theoretically arise
in nearly all constitutional proceedings before the Federal Constitutional Court. Practically it arises only in
the following three [set forth in the text].”).
Donald P. Kommers & Russell A. Miller, Das Bundesverfassungsgericht: Procedure, Practice and Policy of the
German Federal Constitutional Court, 3 J. Comp. L. 194, 197 (2009).
Id. at 197-98.
Andreas Broscheid, I’m *shocked*: Politics even in German constitutional court appointments, Broscheid’s
Notebook, July 27, 2008, available at http://brosch.blogspot.com/2008/07/im-shocked-politics-even-ingerman.html (“Since Germany is a code law country, judicial appointments generally follow a civil-service
system and are less politicized than US appointments . . . . Appointments to the German Federal Constitutional Court are different.”); see also Kommers & Russell, supra note 161, at 200.
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Bundestag, the public election is indirect: the Bundestag selects 12 members to a Judicial Selection
Committee (“JSC”), and the JSC elects the judges. Election to the JSC is by proportional representation (i.e., by party and region).
A judge must receive two-thirds of the votes (eight) to be elected. In the Bundesrat, judges
are also elected by a two-thirds majority of the legislative body. Members vote based on a short
list of potential nominees, which often includes members of the Bundesrat itself. The two bodies
do coordinate, with the Bundesrat conferring with the JSC to avoid redundant efforts. The two
chambers alternate between selecting the Court’s president and vice president.164
Scholars have noted, “The two-thirds majority required to elect a Judge endows opposition
parties in the JSC with considerable leverage over appointments to the Constitutional Court.
Social and Christian Democrats are in a position to veto each other’s judicial nominees, and
the Free Democratic and Green parties, when in coalition with one of the larger parties, have
won seats for their nominees through intra-coalition bargaining. Compromise is a practical
necessity.”165
To be appointed to the German Constitutional Court, a prospective nominee must be forty
years of age and eligible for election to the Bundestag. He or she also must be qualified to act
as a judge pursuant to the Judges Act. If elected to the Constitutional Court, the judge must
not simultaneously hold office in the executive or legislative branch of the federal or a state
government, or work in any other professional occupation other than as a lecturer at a German
college. Furthermore, three of the eight judges on each Senate must be elected from the federal
judiciary.166
Judges on the Constitutional Court serve for a maximum of twelve years. No re-election is
allowed. And a judge must retire at 68, even if the full twelve-year term has not expired.167
The selection of Constitutional Court judges is politically important. “The election of judges to the Federal Constitutional Court . . . is accompanied by a high-profile press campaign,
[with] the press as the fourth power trying to bring transparency into an obviously highly political process. It is not surprising to observe that usually the appointments run strictly along
party-political lines.”168
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Federal Constitutional Court Act (Bundesverfassungsgerichts-Gesetz, (hereinafter “BVerfGG”) §§ 5(1), 6(1),
6(2), 6(5), 7. 9(1). (“Throughout this process, the commission [that creates the shortlist in the Bundesrat]
coordinates its work with that of the JSC. It is important to avoid duplicate judicial selections, and the two
chambers need to agree on the particular senate seats each is going to fill and which of these seats are to be
filled with Justices recruited from the federal high courts.”).
Kommers & Russell, supra note 161, at 200 (“An advisory commission consisting of the state justice ministers
prepares a short list of potentially electable nominees. The justice ministers on the commission, like certain
state governors (Ministerpräsidenten) and members of the Bundestag’s JSC, are often themselves leading
candidates for seats on the Constitutional Court. Informal agreements emerge from the commission’s proceedings, specifying which states shall choose prospective Justices and in what order.”).
BVerfGG, supra note 167, §§ 3(1), 3(3), 3(4), 2(3), 4(1)-(3), 19. Eligibility for election presupposes the right
to vote, and eligibility can be taken away for various reason—such as being in prison for more than a year.
Id. § 4(1)-(3).
Volker G. Heinz, Speech before participants of the Australian Bar Association Conference 1998, The Ap-
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The transparency is, however, significantly limited by the “confidentiality rules in Germany [that] protect all judges from public scrutiny of their views.”169 Confidentiality has proven
difficult to maintain, as evidenced by the failed nomination of Dr. Horst Dreier. Dreier was a
noted scholar, nominated for the Court by the Social Democrats. As his nomination was being
discussed, it was leaked. Having taken positions that angered both the right and left his nomination became controversial. (His support of pre-implantation genetic screening for artificial reproduction angered social conservatives while his support of “rescue torture” angered the left.)
While the far-left Greens began the opposition, in the end the Christian Democrats opposed
Dreier as well, and his nomination was rejected.170
The Dreier incident prompted a discussion within Germany as to whether such politically important decisions ought to be made in secret, along partisan-politics lines. While some
favored more public debate over potential justices, most German scholars and former jurists
preferred the present system.171
A constitutional court like that in Germany has been a popular model for countries recently adopting (or rewriting) their constitutions. This has been the case in post-Franco Spain,
post-Communist Europe, South Africa, South Korea, and some countries in Latin America.172
While ostensibly sympathetic to fundamental personal and institutional rights, the constitutional court model has also proven attractive to authoritarian regimes such as in Egypt, where a
constitutional court was established by former, recently deposed President Mubarak as a way to
give one-party rule a veneer of legitimacy.173

D. Italy
Italy is another civil law system which (like Germany) has a Constitutional Court. Italy has two
“highest” courts, with a Supreme Court of “Cassation” (for civil and penal matters) as well as the
Constitutional Court. The Italian judiciary is comprised of career judges who advance through
bureaucratic appointments with promotion based on a “global evaluation” by the Higher Council of the Judiciary. The Council is responsible for the appointment of all judges in Italy at all
levels. It is composed of judges elected by the judicial profession (two-thirds) and lay members
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pointment of Judges in Germany (July 7, 1998).
Id. at 9.
See Broscheid, supra note 163; Dietmar Hipp, The Man Who Holds Europe’s Destiny in His Hands, Der
Spiegel, Sept. 11, 2012, available at http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/andreas-vosskuhle-haspower-to-decide-europe-s-fate-a-855100-2.html; Ulf Gartzke, Germans Debate “Rescue Torture,” Weekly
Standard, Jan. 25, 2008, available at http://www.weeklystandard.com/weblogs/TWSFP/2008/01/germans_
debate_rescue_torture.asp.
Broscheid, supra note 163.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 1 n. 2, 4. As of 2005, 62 percent of all systems of national constitutional review were of the Kelsenian
(i.e., Austro-German) model. (“[T]he framers of new constitutions have been more attracted to the ‘centralized model’ of constitutional review, with a specialized [constitutional court] at its core, than to the ‘decentralized (or American) model’ of judicial review exercised by the judiciary as a whole.”); see also Sweet, supra
note 162, at 5.

34 / Selecting the very best

(one-third) appointed by Parliament.174 There are three ex officio members: the President of the
Republic, the President of the Court of Cassation, and the Attorney General.175
While the selection process is still dominated by members of the judiciary given their majority position on the Council, corruption scandals in the 1990s prompted a reform in 2002 that
gave Parliament a greater role in the selection process.176 The complaint was that judges were
never subject to any critical review by their peers on the Council, resulting in judges being promoted pro forma.177 The 2002 reform reduced the number of Council members from 33 to 24
and included Parliamentary appointments.178
The Constitutional Court rules on questions of constitutional law, reviewing challenges to
actions of the Italian Parliament, resolving disputes between bodies of government, and hearing
any charges against the President of the Republic. It has 15 members, five of whom are selected
by the President, five of whom are selected by Parliament, and five of whom are selected by the
Higher Council of the Judiciary from the professional judiciary. Members of the Court serve
nine-year terms and cannot be re-elected.179
The Supreme Court of Cassation serves as the court of last resort in civil and penal cases.
It is restricted to errors of substantive law (errores in iudicando), errors of procedure (errores in
procedendo), and “defects” or errors of reasoning (i.e., “lacking sufficient or [containing] contradictory grounds”). The Cassation Court also has the authority to determine jurisdiction and
competence (that is, which Italian court should hear the case). The Court is made up of members of the professional judiciary, as selected by the Higher Council of the Judiciary.180
Italian judges receive lifetime appointments, subject to mandatory retirement at 70. There
is no special procedure for removal. Professional judges start as lowest-court judges at the beginning of their professional careers, serving only as judges throughout their judicial tenure.181
The Italian judiciary has a reputation for political corruption.182 The World Justice Project
rates Italy lowest amongst the major European countries, noting that “corruption and impunity
of government officials undermine the performance of state institutions,” and the justice system
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Carlo Guarnieri, Justice and Politics: The Italian Case in a Comparative Perspective, 4 Ind. Int’l & Comp. L.
Rev. 241, 248 (1994).
Wim Voermans & Pim Albers, Councils for the Judiciary in EU Countries, European Comm’n for the Efficiency of Justice, Council of Europe 70 (2003), available at http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/cepej/
textes/CouncilOfJusticeEurope_en.pdf.
Nuno Garoupa & Tom Ginsburg, Guarding the Guardians: Judicial Councils and Judicial Independence, John
M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper No. 444, University of Chicago Law School (Nov. 2008) at *6.
Nuno Garoupa & Tom Ginsburg, The Comparative Law & Economics of Judicial Councils, 27 Berkeley J.
Int’l L. 53, 76 (2009).
Id. at 76-77.
Const. of Italy Dec. 22, 1947, art. 134, 135; see also Samuel A. Alito, An Introduction to the Italian Constitutional Court (May 31, 1972) (unpublished A.B. thesis, Princeton University), available at www.princeton.
edu/~mudd/news/Alito_thesis.pdf.
Corte Supreme di Cassazione, Arte e Storia, www.cortedicassazione.it/Cassazione/ArteStoria/ArteStoria.
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Voermans & Albers, supra note 175, at 65-66.
Id. at 65.
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is slow.183 The Global Competitiveness Report similarly notes Italy’s “high levels of corruption
and organized crime and a perceived lack of independence within the judicial system.” Italy
ranks 133rd (out of 142) for the efficiency of its legal framework for settling disputes, 126th for
the ability to challenge governmental action, 127th for trust of government officials, and 119th
in terms of favoritism to well connected firms and individuals.184

E. China185
The Chinese legal system is evolving in light of the many economic and legal reforms that
the ruling Communist Party has been initiating as the Party seeks to have China become the
world’s leading economy. As the World Justice Project observed, China has seen significant
improvement in recent years. It “scores well on public safety, ranking thirty-second overall and
fourth among its income peers,” and has a relatively effective and speedy judicial system. But
the WJP also noted that “judicial independence is a concern,” “indicators of fundamental rights
are weak,” and “[t]he criminal justice system is . . . compromised by political interference and
violations of due process of law.”186
Given its drive for economic development, China clearly recognizes the need to be perceived as having a legal system that is governed by the rule of law, something that decidedly
was not part of China’s history. In imperial China, judges had no independence. The Emperor
had supreme authority in all affairs, including the administration of justice. Local officials were
principally responsible for the routine duties of administration, such as the collection of taxes,
but were also tasked with resolving legal disputes.187
Efforts were made to establish an independent judiciary after the Emperor was overthrown
with the founding of the Republic of China in 1912. The Provisional Constitution of the Republic established a Central Tribunal to exercise supreme judicial power over civil and criminal
matters. The Tribunal’s judges were to be appointed by the interim president and the attorney
general. The provisional government set forth qualifications for appointment as judges. But this
Americanized system was never implemented. The reform efforts were disrupted by infighting
among various regional warlords, the beginning of World War II, and the follow-on Chinese
civil war that resulted in the formation of the People’s Republic of China by Mao Zedong and
the Chinese Communist Party, in 1949.188
Following the Communist Party’s takeover, the Republic’s legal system was abolished. All
judicial officers were dismissed in favor of a revolutionary regime. According to the theory of
class struggle at that time, the existing judicial officers were considered “class enemies,” viewed
183
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WJP 2013, supra note 2, at 26.
GCR, supra at note 3, at 27, 393-400.
This section is gratefully acknowledged to be based on the legal research and observations of Qiang Zhou,
Huiqiong Deng, and Congying Bai, Attorneys at Law and Partners, ZY Partners, Beijing, China.
WJP 2013, supra note 2, at 30.
See Mi Yong, Research on the Selection Measures of Judges 51-59 (April 2009) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Jilin University).
Id.
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as “tools for repression of the people.” The Communist Party issued a directive called “Determining Principles of Justice in the Liberated Areas.”189 The directive resulted in what has been
called “the age of the socialist legal system”—in essence, a time without any rule of law—with
the seemingly endless political persecutions of the Chinese Cultural Revolution.190
Starting in 1976, the Communist Party began implementing the “Reform and Opening-up
Policy.” As part of that effort, the Party focused on the value, for successful economic development, of a legal system that is perceived to respect the rule of law. In 1995, the Party enacted the
Law of the People’s Republic of China on Judges, establishing professional qualification for the
appointment of judges and creating the Supreme People’s Court. In 2001, the National People’s
Congress (“NPC”) revised the Judges Law to strengthen the professionalism and independence of
the judiciary, in part through the establishment of the NPC’s Standing Legal Affairs Committee.191
The Judges Law set minimal qualifications relating to education and legal experience for
judges of the Supreme People’s Court and lower levels of the judiciary. However, political correctness remains a core requirement: “[T]o have fine political and professional quality and to be
good in conduct.”192
To be on the Supreme People’s Court, a judge must have “at least eight years” of legal experience.193 All new judges for any court must pass a unified national judicial examination, although
previously appointed judges were exempted from that requirement. That means the Chinese judiciary is still populated with many judges selected primarily by the Communist Party leaders based
on their political reliability and willingness to appease the Party and its government officials.194
189
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193
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The main contents of the directive provided that: (i) “The judicial work of the people … must be based on
the new laws made by the people;” (ii) “Before the people’s new laws are released systematically, the judicial
work shall be based upon the CPC’s policies and various guiding principles, laws, regulations and resolutions
issued by the People’s Government and the People’s Liberation Army;” (iii) “The judiciaries shall always educate and reform the judicial officers by defying and criticizing … all anti-people laws and decrees of the capitalist countries, including European countries, the United States and Japan, and learning and understanding
the view of the state, the view of laws and new-democratic policies, principles, laws, orders, regulations and
resolutions reflecting the Marxism, Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought.”
During the Cultural Revolution (1952-1976), knowledge of law was entirely secondary to having the proper
socialist revolutionary consciousness and Communist Party affiliation in judicial appointments. Zhang Hua
and Wang Li, Research on the Judge Selection System in China, 2004 Jinling Legal Rev. 149-50.
Judges Law of the People’s Republic of China, translation available at http://en.chinacourt.org/public/detail.
php?id=2692.
Article 9 of the Judges Law states: A judge must possess the following qualifications: (1) to be of the nationality of the People’s Republic of China; (2) to have reached the age of 23; (3) to endorse the Constitution of
the People’s Republic of China; (4) to have fine political and professional quality and to be good in conduct;
(5) to be in good health; and (6) to have worked for at least two years in the case of graduates from law specialties of colleges or universities or from non-law specialties of colleges or universities but possessing the
professional knowledge of law; or to have worked for at least one year in the case of Bachelors of Law; those
who have Master’s Degree of Law or Doctor’s Degree of Law may be not subject to the abovementioned
requirements for the number of years set for work.
Article 9 of The Interim Measures for Public Selection of Candidates to Newly Appointed Judges and Procurators (2008).
Song Jianchao and Fu Xiangbo, Explore the Judge Selection System with Chinese Characteristics, People’s Ct.
Daily (July 11, 2005); Wang Liming, Research on Judicial Reform 456 (2nd ed. 2001).
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The President of the Supreme People’s Court is selected (and can be removed) by the National People’s Congress. Other judges of the People’s Court are appointed and removed by the
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, upon the recommendation of the President of the People’s Court. The presidents of the local people’s courts are selected and removed
by the applicable local people’s congress.195
In practice, the judges for all courts are determined by the parallel level of the Communist
Party, with all appointments reviewed centrally by the Party’s Organization Department. Only
candidates nominated by the Party may be submitted to Congress for election. The appointment
of judges by the People’s Congress is a mere formality.196
The Chinese Constitution provides that Congress has the power to supervise the courts.197
The authority of the Supreme People’s Court is limited. The Court has no power to review the
constitutionality or legality of actions by the government or the Communist Party. Accordingly, the basic function of judges is to adjudicate criminal matters and private civil disputes in
accordance with the relevant laws.
Even in the performance of these limited functions, the judiciary is effectively under the influence of the Communist Party and its appointed governmental officials.198 And this influence
is regularly and actively exercised through Party “instructions,” including shielding the illegal
or criminal acts of Party leaders.199
In theory, judges cannot be arbitrarily removed. The Judges Law provides that “[j]udges
shall enjoy the . . . right[] . . . to be not removed or demoted from the post or dismissed, and to be
195
196
197

198
199

Judges Law, supra note 191, art. 11.
Sun Jian, Establishment of Judge Selection and Appointment System, L. Sci. Magazine, Mar. 15, 2004.
The specific provisions of the Constitution are as follows:
Article 3: All administrative, judicial and prosecutorial organs of the state are created by the people’s congresses to which they are responsible and under whose supervision they operate. . . .
Article 67: The Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress exercises the following functions and
powers: . . . (6) [S]upervise the work of the State Council, the Central Military Commission, the Supreme
People’s Court and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate; . . .
Article 104: The standing committee of a local people’s congress at or above the county level discusses and
decides on major issues in all fields of work in its administrative area; supervises the work of the people’s
government, people’s court and people’s procuratorate at the corresponding level;. . .
Article 128: The Supreme People’s Court is responsible to the National People’s Congress and its Standing
Committee. Local people’s courts at different levels are responsible to the organs of state power which created
them.
See Randall Peerenboom, Judicial Independence in China 71 (2009).
See Guo Daohui, Enforce the Judicial Independence, and Contain the Judicial Corruption, 1 Legal Sci. (1999);
Zhou Daoluan, A Critical Comment on Supervision in Specific Cases and Relevant Proposals, Research
on the People’s Representative Congress, 2004/3. Chinese law explicitly requires that “the people’s courts
should actively accept the supervision from the people’s congress, the political consultative conferences,
the procuratorate, and the society.” “The people’s courts should actively obtain the support of various social
sectors, and enhance the cooperation with them, so as to build a good external environment.” Opinions of
Thoroughly Implementing the Spirit of the National Television and Telephone Meeting of the Political and
Judicial Work, Supreme People’s Court, December 24, 2009. See also Wang Liming, Research on Judicial Re
form, Law Press 87 (2001).
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not given a sanction, without statutory basis and without going through statutory procedures.”
But in practice, there is a relatively simple process for dismissal. The Judges Law allows for
removal if a judge is “determined to be incompetent in the post through appraisal” or “disqualified from continuing to hold the post because of violation of discipline, law or commission of
a crime.” These vague standards provide ample bases for removal if a judge crosses someone in
power in the Communist Party. This problem is compounded by the fact that there is a system
of “investigation against wrong judgments.” Under this system, a judge can, if he or she makes a
“wrong” ruling, be sanctioned with penalties including a reduction of pay, disqualification from
promotion, or demotion of or removal from office.200
An additional deterrent to judicial independence is the relatively low pay for judges. Judges
are paid like other government officials; they do not have a separate salary or benefit arrangement. Although judges and government officials have had their salaries increased several times
in recent years, compared with other professions (e.g., employees of state owned enterprises,
university teachers, governmental departments like industry, commence, tax, and finance),
their salaries are low.201 This has made it difficult to attract quality judges. Excellent law students
do not want to become judges; good judges tend to leave the judiciary. As a consequence, the
remaining judges are subject to economic as well as political corruption.202
Judicial corruption is a recognized problem.203 A 2012 report, submitted to the People’s
Congress and the Political Consultative Conference states that during 2011, “ the various courts
have investigated 519 personnel who violated the discipline or the law, among whom 77 people
were prosecuted due to corruption, bribery or abuse of law during adjudication[.]” The general
perception is that the actual number of judges involved in judicial corruption far exceeds the
data release by the Chinese government.204
The Chinese Communist Party has declared that a “central [political] task” is to “rule the
country by law, implement the law for the people, fair and just, [provide] service to the macro-society, and stick to the party’s leadership.” In December 2007, Hu Jintao, the secretary of
the Communist Party, explained that judicial personnel should “stick to the supremacy of the
Party’s cause, supremacy of the people’s interest, and supremacy of the constitution and law, so
as to undertake the historical mission and political task of leading the vast judges, prosecutors
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Judges Law, supra note 191, art. 83, 13; see also Li Xuli, A Comparative Research on the Job Security Sys
tem for Chinese and Foreign Judges, Chinese Jurisprudence Net, http://www.iolaw.org.cn/showNews.asp?id=16146.
See Zhou Changzhu, Discussion on the Relationship between Judges’ Welfare Security and the Construction of
Modern Country Ruled by Law, Research Center for Government By Law, http://law.china.cn/book/
txt/2007-12/17/content_1953060.htm.
See Su Li, Review of the Judges Selection System, 3 Jurisprudence (2004); Zhou Changzhu, Discussion on the
Relationship between Judges’ Welfare Security and the Construction of Modern Country Ruled by Law, http://
law.china.cn; Wang Liming, Research on Judicial Reform, Law Press 478 (2001); Xiao Yang, The System Con
struction and Improvement Is a Guaranty of the Judges’ Team Construction, People’s Justice, 1998/5.
Eric Chi-yeung Ip, Judicial Corruption and its Threats to National Governance in China, 7 J.
Admin. & Gov. 80 (2012).
Yu Xiaopei, Discussion on Prevention of Judicial Corruption (Chinese), http://srzy.chinacourt.org/public/
detail.php?id=619.
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and other personnel to safeguard the scientific development and promote social harmony.”205
The President of the Supreme People’s Court, Wang Shengjun, has advanced the notion
of “active adjudication.” While suggesting independence, the reality is that the interests of the
Communist Party trump “the people’s interest.”206
In sum, notwithstanding China’s economic success, the country’s actual legal system provides no new lessons for countries in deciding how best to promote the rule of law. China’s
economic success has been admirable but, if anything, its growth has been hampered by the
general perception — inside and outside of China — that its judiciary presently has limited to
no independence from the Communist Party.207

F. International Lessons
The central lesson from these other countries is the recognition that promoting a more effective
operation of the rule of law is a goal for all of them, including China. Each nation has its peculiar cultural traditions and legal history that has produced the structure and actual operation of
their respective legal systems. Few countries replicate the deference to authority and ancestry in
Japan, the rigid discipline of the Germans or the fragmentation and pervasive societal corruption of Italy. That said, England’s willingness to undertake substantial, recent reforms in the interest of making its judicial system a more modern representation of the entire British populace
is instructive. It demonstrates that other countries can and should consider their own efforts to
enhance the operation of the rule of law through processes for the selection and appointment of
more qualified, independent, impartial and societally diverse judges, committed to due process
for all.

205
206

207

Id.
He Weifang, Among the Three Supremacies, Which One Is Really Supreme, http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/
blog_488663200100atga.html; Theoretic Study on Further Deepening the Guiding Thinking of “Three Supremacies”, available at http://old.chinacourt.org/html/article/200906/26/362750.shtml.
WJP 2013, supra note 2, at 30.
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IV. Conclusions

T

he overall well-being and happiness of a country’s citizenry is directly affected by the
degree to which the nation operates by the rule of law. That requires enforcement by an
independent judiciary. How judges are selected and appointed is critical to achieving the
judicial independence that is needed for the rule of law, with due process for all, to prevail over
the inevitable efforts at political influence and economic corruption.

The quality and independence of the judges selected for and appointed to a nation’s Supreme Court sets the tone for the overall quality and independence of a country’s judicial system as a whole. Therefore, this paper has focused on how Supreme Court justices are selected
and appointed in a representative cross-section of nations around the world and how the differing approaches have impacted the relative independence of their respective judiciaries and their
willingness and ability to enforce the rule of law. Based on that analysis and as further detailed
below, we recommend a transparent and merit-based system for the appointment of Supreme
Court justices for all nations.
As explained above and further emphasized below, transparency can only be achieved
through the evolution of an active free press and an interested citizenry. The press and the people must have the capacity and courage to demand freedom of speech and individual liberties,
including the right to be governed by a legal system based on the rule of law, with due process
for all, enforced by independent and impartial judges. That requires continuous education of
the populace from an early age, on the importance to the nation and its citizens of the rule
of law and the protection of everyone’s human rights. The path to progress requires an active
commitment by the press, educators and academics to carry the message to the public, so that
the citizenry can be motivated to demand that the governing political powers accept the need
themselves to commit (and submit) to the rule of law.

A. A Checks and Balances Process for Selection and Approval
The approach taken in the Unites States (and other nations)—of nomination by a democratically elected executive, with final approval by an elected legislature through hearings open to
the press and public—has, in the United States, proven superior to the other alternatives of
nominating committees, popular elections and executive/legislative or judiciary-only appointments. The states of California, New York, New Jersey, as well as England, have been gravitating
towards the executive/legislative model.
The U.S. experience demonstrates that the time required for the executive/legislative,
checks-and-balances approach allows an intense media focus on the selection and appointment
processes, with a roadmap that can be readily explained to and understood by the general populace. The duration and recognized importance of the process promotes awareness, interest and
transparency.
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This method avoids the complexity of nominating committees, whether comprised of professional lawyers, other judges, or government officials, who themselves must be selected and
appointed. In Arizona, nominating committees have been shown to diminish public and press
interest in the process of selecting and approving Supreme Court justices because of the (too
often false) appearance that “independent experts” are protecting the public’s interest. In Japan
and England, allowing existing judges to select their successors has resulted in less dynamic and
representative judiciaries.
Press and other media attention on the selection and appointment process enhances public
awareness of the importance to a nation and its populace of who is allowed to serve on the country’s Supreme Court. Both the executive and the legislature can—and should—be encouraged to
solicit the views of the nation’s bar association, legal scholars and others (as is done in the United
States and elsewhere as shown above). Media and the critically necessary public interest in the
process provide a potential discipline upon the decisionmakers, enhancing the likelihood that
more competent, qualified, independent and impartial Supreme Court justices will be selected
and appointed, or the decisionmakers may face an adverse reaction from the public, at the ballot
box or otherwise.
In the U.S., the checks and balances approach applied in the selection of the U.S. Supreme
Court has proven more effective in promoting public interest and media focus than the popular
election of judges, as seen in Texas and Mississippi. Judicial elections may appear appealing as a
nation moves from an authoritarian to a more democratic government, with popular elections.
But as seen from the experience in those states in the U.S. which have experimented with (and
in several, like California and New York, abandoned) popular elections, the elected-judiciary
approach has proven ineffective in achieving the press and public attention that is critical to the
success of the process. Furthermore, the need to raise money for elections has been a source of
corruption and politicization. It has also diminished the likelihood that the most qualified and
competent people are willing to serve as Supreme Court justices.
Solely executive (effectively China) or legislative appointments (South Carolina) of justices
have similarly proven to be less effective to safeguard judicial independence and the quality
of judges. Solitary control diminishes the likelihood of close press or public scrutiny, and it
enhances the probability of the politicization of the justices. That diminishes the likelihood of
judicial independence, particularly as to any review of executive or legislative action. An ability
and willingness of the judiciary to act as a check on inappropriate, unfair or corrupt governmental action is an essential element of an effective rule of law system.
An important caveat is that the structure of the selection process cannot itself assure that a
nation’s Supreme Court will have the type of qualified, competent, independent and impartial
justices that will enforce the rule of law. As explained below, there are a number of other factors that are critical to having an effective judicial system, the most essential of which is public
awareness of the importance to the nation’s success—and the well-being and happiness of its
citizenry—of having the types of Supreme Court justices who can and will enforce the rule of
law, with due process for all.
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To that end, the people of a nation must be vocal—in public debate and at the ballot box—
about their demand both for competent candidates, with the right qualities, and for transparency in the selection and appointment process. An active free press is essential to public awareness
and interest. All of this is best promoted by education from an early age on the value to the
nation and its citizenry of an independent judiciary.
In short, a bottom-up movement fostered by the press, educators and academics is the surest path to progress.

B. Life Tenure, with Mandatory Retirement and Circumscribed
Rights of Removal
Experience has shown that independence, and the ability to attract and retain more qualified
Supreme Court justices, is enhanced by lifetime appointments. Life tenure prevents the need
for a justice to consider the implications of his or her present rulings on reappointment (or
election), or the ability to obtain a legal or other position at the end of his or her term of office.
Lifetime appointments have the additional benefit of assuring that the Court will have justices
with greater judicial experience and, arguably, more competence in dealing with the types of
important and complex issues that must routinely be resolved by a nation’s highest court.
The criticism of the U.S. Supreme Court’s lifetime appointment system—that allows potentially senile judges to stay on until a politically opportune time to resign—can be avoided by a
mandatory retirement age. Many states in the U.S. and many nations have mandatory retirement ages. Given increased longevity and the desirability for longer tenures, a mandatory retirement age—of no more than 80 (as recently proposed for New York) and no less than 70—would
be appropriate to balance the competing interests of competency and predictable turnover. A
specific benefit of a mandatory retirement age is that it allows the press and public to focus attention on potential appointees (and their respective merits) in the time immediately before a
justice is known to have to resign because of age.
Of course, there must always be a process for removal of a Supreme Court justice. But the
threat of removal should be narrowly circumscribed to conduct detrimental to the independence and integrity of the Court itself, e.g., evidence of corruption, mental incapacity, criminal misconduct, and the like. The process for removal should mirror the process for approval,
meaning that a justice should not be removed without having the due process of open hearings
before the legislative body that confirmed him or her, on any claimed grounds for removal.
Impeachment should require a two-thirds majority vote, to deter ready resort to the removal
process for political dissatisfaction

C. Supreme Court Justices’ Pay Should Be Meaningful and
Protected
As seen in New York, a judicial salary of sufficient magnitude to attract qualified candidates
should be guaranteed. There should be no ability of the executive or legislature to manipulate
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(other than by periodic increases). Such protected pay has proven to be a further stimulus to the
independence of the judiciary. The fact of life tenure and the societal stature of being a Supreme
Court justice should mean that the pay can be well below what is obtainable in private practice.
Having the pay scale continue (like a pension) after retirement would have the further effect
of allowing resignations, e.g., for poor health, prior to the mandatory retirement age. The right
to continued pay should cease if a retired justice enters private practice or some other government or regularly remunerative position.

D. A Reasonable, Uneven Number of Justices
It is important to allow the multiplicity of viewpoints in a Supreme Court. Experience has taught
that this leads to the best quality of thoughtful decisionmaking. However, too large a number of
justices make deliberations to decide a matter, cumbersome and inefficient. An uneven number
is advisable to allow a majority decision in most cases. There is no “right” number but nine justices (like for the U.S. Supreme Court) has seemed to be a good balance.

E. Qualifications to Be a Supreme Court Justice
The quality of the justices appointed to a nation’s Supreme Court is the ultimate determinant of
its independence and commitment to the rule of law. We believe that, in order to be appointed
a justice, a candidate should have the following qualifications:

1. Independence and impartiality: a judicial temperament
The foundation for a successfully functioning Supreme Court is the impartiality and independence of its members. In other words, judges should not be influenced by interests beyond the
law. This is an important guarantee that their decisions will be based solely on legal considerations. Impartiality and independence require a judicial temperament, the ability and willingness to engage in thoughtful, open-minded analysis and collegial deliberations before reaching
a final determination.
Justices should not only be independent and impartial but should also be seen as being independent and impartial. Candidates should not have any political or economic commitments
which may suggest that they lack this quality. To test the question of actual and likely future
independence and impartiality, it is recommended that all candidates be required to furnish a
sworn statement containing a comprehensive list of clients, contractors, former work and professional colleagues, as well as business and professional entities in which they have a stake or
have been involved with in the past. That statement should be timely available to the press and
public and should be assessed thoroughly in the open hearings about the candidate’s qualifications for approval as a justice.

2. Reputable conduct and spotless record of integrity
A spotless record of conduct and a reputation for personal integrity are important factors for
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promoting respect for and confidence in a justice’s commitment to the rule of law. Moreover,
morally or ethically improper conduct, beyond discrediting a justice’s personal reputation and
that of the Court generally, could render a justice more vulnerable to improper influence.
As part of the overall assessment process, a candidate’s work and other references should
be checked thoroughly. The person should not have been sanctioned by a court or an ethics
committee of a bar or other organization. The public hearing should examine these issues, as
well as any observations or challenges made by citizens. All allegations of misconduct should be
investigated and taken into account when assessing a candidate’s appropriateness to be a justice.

3. Outstanding knowledge of the law and legal analysis
Another fundamental characteristic of a Supreme Court justice should be his or her legal
knowledge and experience. The importance and complexity of cases coming before a Supreme
Court means that its justices should have an excellent history of understanding and assessing
legal issues. This suggests that the best candidates are judges on the nation’s lower courts, with
proven experience in making independent and impartial judgments on important and complex
legal questions.
Consideration should also be given to:
■■

The academic education of the candidate;

■■

The publication of legal articles or books which have received positive peer reviews
(i.e., publications that have been recognized as being important contributions to legal
debate);

■■

Academic or professional lectures on legal issues;

■■

Public recognition as a legal expert (i.e., he or she has been a resource person for national and international entities);

■■

The candidate’s experience and reputation amongst his or her peers in private practice
or governmental service on legal issues; and

■■

If the candidate is a prior or current judge, his or her judicial decisions and reputation
for independence and impartiality.

4. Excellent oral and written communication skills
Because of the important and often complex nature of the work undertaken by a Supreme Court,
justices must not only be capable of properly analyzing the substance of an issue that is brought
before the Court, they must also be able to communicate their ideas clearly, both orally and in
writing. This means that candidates should possess advanced legal reasoning and analytical
skills, both oral and written, and should be able to express their opinions clearly and properly to
even a non-lawyer audience, i.e. the general citizenry of the nation.
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To assess a candidate’s oral and written skills, it is important that at least a representative
sampling of briefs, decisions, and other documents prepared by the candidate during his or her
career be investigated and reviewed in an open hearing. The candidate’s reputation for presentations in professional forums and his or her performance at the open hearing should be considered as to the candidate’s oral communication skills.

5. Highly developed creative intelligence and collaborative skills
Given the nature and inherent pressures of the work performed by a Supreme Court and the
potential impact of its decisions, justices should be prepared to deal creatively with new situations and problems. It is therefore important that justices possess the following characteristics:
■■

A problem-solving orientation;

■■

A capacity to build consensus; and

■■

An ability to take into account other people’s views.

In order to assess these capacities, the candidate could present examples of situations in
which those skills were applied in the past. These experiences should be examined and evaluated at the public hearing.

6. Commitment to the judiciary as an independent institution
The Supreme Court is not only the highest court in a country, but it is also plays a leadership role
in the administration and organization of the judiciary. Therefore, candidates should demonstrate an understanding of their responsibility for maintaining the judicial branch as a separate
and independent public institution that acts as a counterbalance to the nation’s executive and
legislative branches of government.

7. Demonstrated commitment to the protection of human rights, democratic val
ues, and transparency
Protection of individual human rights and democratic values are at the heart of modern democracies. Transparency of public administration is a critical element in assuring the effective
operation of the rule of law and due process for all.
Given the importance of these principles, Supreme Court candidates should prove their
commitment to such values through examples from past written documents and public statements. These matters should be examined during the open hearings on a candidate’s nomination.

8. Ability to understand the social and legal consequences of one’s decisions
Because Supreme Court decisions often have such a significant impact on the social and economic well-being of the country, justices must be aware of this responsibility and the need to act
judiciously: a justice must have a judicial temperament.
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If a candidate is a sitting judge, the open hearings should focus on his or her past judgments
to assess this quality. Written material and public statements by the candidate should also be
examined.

9. Ability to strike a sound balance between a high level of productivity and care
ful consideration of cases
The work of a justice, in addition to being critically important for the country, is extremely
demanding. Experience shows that many cases heard by a Supreme Court are complex and sensitive. To ensure the timely delivery of justice—another fundamental human right that must be
safeguarded by the judiciary—a Supreme Court works under great pressure. It is essential that
the justices are able to find the right balance between maintaining a high level of productivity
as well as ensuring high-quality decisions, based on a thorough analysis of the issues brought
before them.
Candidates for Supreme Court vacancies should demonstrate their experience with and
aptitude for working in such an environment, by providing examples of pressured performance.
These issues should be addressed during the open hearing.

10. Diversity
Because of its importance in the overall fabric of a nation’s government, the composition of a
country’s Supreme Court should reasonably reflect its demographics. Therefore, as shown in
the discussion of the recent appointments to the U.S. Supreme Court, consideration should be
given in the selection and approval process of the desire to see a fair representation of women
as well as men. And there should be an effort to have justices from the various nationalities and
ethnicities that are prevalent in the nation.
Diversity decidedly does not mean that there should be a focus on the political party affiliations of the candidates. The whole point is to select and appoint competent, independent,
impartial persons, with a judicial temperament and a commitment to the rule of law. That is not
to say that politics will not play any role in the selection of potential candidates. The discussion
of the process in the United States for the selection and approval of its Supreme Court justices
demonstrates that politics is always a factor. But protections like life tenure, with guaranteed
pay, and assurances through the transparent process of the open hearings, that a candidate possesses the proper—non-political— qualification articulated above, are critical to achieving a Supreme Court that will rule on the basis of the law, not the prevailing political party’s preferences.

F. Education of the Nation’s Citizenry from an Early Age and
Through Freedom of the Press and Speech
As we have emphasized throughout this paper, experience across the globe has shown that, to
have a legal system that is governed by judicial independence starts with impartial Supreme
Court justices who will enforce the rule of law, with due process for all. Early, ongoing education
is the best stimulus to the nation’s people becoming vocal about their demands for transparency in the selection and appointment process, and their expectation that justices with the right
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qualities of independence and impartiality will be appointed. That requires courageous teachers
and professors.
The commitment to this essential education begins with the teachers, but ultimately the
demand must come from the people. That demand can be fostered by the press and other media which must be equally forceful and courageous. The press should be an active promoter of
public awareness of the importance of who is appointed to the nation’s Supreme Court and why.
IN CONCLUSION, while no judicial system will be a perfect fit for every country, we are
hopeful that this discussion will aid each country’s decisionmakers in tailoring a judicial system—and a selection and approval process for its Supreme Court justices and other judges—
that promotes both the rule of law and respect for human rights.
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